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Executive summary 
Introduction 
UK regulatory practice is highly regarded worldwide, and regulation of the private sector is 
generally seen as having improved over the past decade as a result of successive government 
initiatives and regulators’ own efforts. 
This Regulatory Futures Review arose from a view among regulators that significant 
improvements in operational efficiency could be found by sharing good practice between 
regulators and developing more collaborative working models, and that this would help achieve 
ambitious spending review targets. 
The objectives, agreed between a steering group of regulators and the Cabinet Office, were to: 
 identify opportunities to achieve significant improvements in operating efficiency by reviewing 
functions across the sector looking particularly at the experience of businesses and 
consumers affected by regulation; 
 identify the sources of burdens on regulators themselves, the opportunities to reduce those 
burdens and hence to reduce cost, complexity and delays in regulation; and 
 develop a taxonomy of effective regulatory delivery models that makes it possible to extend 
the work of this review across all regulators. 
The review is the first of a series of functional reviews of arm’s length bodies, and was led and 
carried out by regulators themselves. It excluded a number of regulators already involved in other 
reviews, notably the economic regulators. Owing to the large number of regulators in scope (70+) 
as well as differing levels of involvement, the review focused on some key themes: 
 the future of regulation; 
 regulated self-assurance and earned recognition; 
 charging for regulation; 
 collaboration between regulators; and 
 burdens on regulators. 
This report makes recommendations in each area, and gives estimates of the potential 
financial impact of our proposals and how implementation of our recommendations should be 
taken forward. 
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The future of regulation 
Regulated entities, whether public, private or voluntary sector, have the main responsibility for 
meeting legal requirements and for providing the quality expected by their customers, employees, 
investors and others. They are also responsible for satisfying stakeholders, including regulators, 
that they are meeting legal requirements. 
The best organisations achieve this partly through effective self-assurance. We see this in safety-
critical sectors (e.g. civil aviation), in public services (e.g. in schools and hospitals), in supply 
chains (e.g. the Red Tractor scheme in the food sector) and industry schemes (e.g. the gas safety 
register). 
Some organisations fail to meet their responsibilities through ignorance or lack of capacity: for 
example, some small businesses and failing public sector bodies, such as some schools and 
hospitals. Others wilfully ignore their responsibilities: for example, illegal gangmasters and illegal 
waste operators. 
Neither the state nor individual regulators are directly responsible for each regulated entity 
meeting its legal obligations or quality expectations. Organisations should be able to find the best 
way to self-assure that they are meeting their legal responsibilities (although where the state itself 
is the purchaser of services some additional assurance will often be necessary). The job of 
regulators, then, is mainly to provide information and advice to ensure that organisations assure 
themselves effectively and reliably, and intervene when they do not. 
Effective regulatory delivery models should therefore focus, as far as possible, on outcomes. 
While outcome-based regulation is a long accepted regulatory principle, many regulators face a 
constant battle to resist pressures to increase regulatory prescription. 
Regulators should use the range of levers available to them in addition to their own statutory 
powers to reduce harm and ensure quality. These levers can include the influence of users and 
consumers, of buyers and commissioners, and other professionals involved in the sector. Using 
these levers, as well as regulated entities’ own quality management systems ensures that 
assurance processes of all kinds can be minimised whilst still meeting desired regulatory 
outcomes. 
Regulated self-assurance and earned recognition 
We propose a general shift towards what we have termed ‘regulated self-assurance’. Many 
regulators already practise this: for example, in the food industry, through earned recognition via 
membership of the Red Tractor assurance scheme, and through companies’ self-assurance in 
the egg and poultry industries. However, there is scope to extend this approach not just in the 
food industry but also more generally, especially among inspection-focused regulators. These 
include the Food Standards Agency (FSA), the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA), 
and the Environment Agency. Where services are publicly funded, and/or there is limited user 
choice of provider, as is the case for many of the services regulated by Ofsted and the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC), we call this approach ‘earned recognition’ to emphasise the fact that 
inspection will still be key given the state’s role as a purchaser of some of the services and in 
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ensuring user confidence in the quality of the service. However, such inspection should be 
proportionate and focused on where there are problems. Furthermore, if alternative forms of 
assurance schemes were to be brought forward, the threshold for approval would need to be very 
high in order to command the confidence of the public, service users and Ministers. 
Greater use of regulated self-assurance and earned recognition will lead to greater efficiency in 
meeting regulatory outcomes and reduce the burden of duplicate assurance processes on 
businesses.  
Regulated self-assurance and earned recognition is different from self-regulation. In many of the 
highly-regulated sectors, regulatory frameworks make substantial use of the internal quality 
assurance and reporting processes of regulated entities: for example, the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate (DWI) takes this approach with water companies. 
In practice this means that businesses who ‘do the right thing’ should be regulated with a very 
light touch. As part of this, regulators should encourage more ethical business practices. 
However, where regulated entities do not ‘do the right thing’ and do not follow ethical business 
practices, redress should be sought. 
Over time, external assurance schemes may be able to consolidate different regulatory inspection 
and assurance functions in a way that has sometimes been difficult for individual regulators to 
achieve. This has the potential to reduce further the burden of multiple inspection visits and 
information collection, which can cause great frustration for the regulated and increase regulated 
entity costs. 
Competition and choice in such schemes can be a good thing, and may help to unlock the 
potential disruptive effects of new technology to provide new solutions to legal compliance and 
quality management. 
Charging for regulation 
Where regulated self-assurance is feasible, government should implement fully its existing policy 
of funding regulators through charges on those they regulate, rather than through Exchequer 
funding. It is still the case that around half the cost of running regulators is met by government 
grant rather than through charges, largely due to lack of legislative powers, time limitations, and 
because of history and circumstance. 
Where costs are not fully covered in charges, there is a disincentive to the adoption of regulated 
self-assurance. There should therefore be a default presumption of full cost recovery for 
regulatory activities where regulated self-assurance is feasible. This may not be appropriate in 
every case, such as where the sector regulated is generally publicly funded, or perhaps where 
one of the regulator’s main activities is providing information or education.  
In addition, (as long as this does not deter self-reporting) entities who impose the greatest cost 
on regulators should bear that cost themselves (cost-reflective charging) rather than it being 
spread across all regulated entities. Consistent with this principle, more self-assurance by the 
regulated should, where possible, be accompanied by a reduced charge for regulation by the 
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regulator. This should help to ensure that compliant entities will have less to fear from full-cost 
charging for regulatory services and may gain a competitive advantage relative to less 
effective operators. 
We also believe there is a strong case for HM Treasury to allow regulators greater freedom to 
recover enforcement costs through charges, rather than covering costs from grant in aid. Our 
proposed approach of ‘earned recognition’ for those who do the right thing also requires adequate 
levels of enforcement against those who wilfully do not. 
Introducing greater regulated self-assurance would also introduce contestability into assurance 
processes, creating a competitive pressure on the regulator to increase efficiency. Alongside a 
requirement to consult on fees and charges, this should allay concerns that a greater use of fees 
and charges might lead to greater inefficiency in the regulators.  
The proposals for greater regulated self-assurance and a presumption of full cost recovery are 
closely linked. Putting the costs of regulation on the regulated will incentivise them to find more 
efficient ways of meeting regulatory requirements and reduce the internal costs of the regulated 
in dealing with the regulators. 
Greater collaboration between regulators 
We found untapped scope to improve intelligence and data sharing between regulators. The 
benefits of data sharing mainly accrue to the regulated, through only having to ‘tell us once’. Our 
work identified some of the information and data being collected, and this work is being taken 
forward by a number of other initiatives led by the Government Digital Service and others. 
In this review, therefore, we have looked more at the potential of intelligence sharing to inform 
more targeted and efficient regulatory activities. Pathfinder projects have been identified in the 
areas of farm inspection and labour market enforcement, and the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) is pursuing these projects with the relevant regulators. Other longer-term projects have 
also been identified. 
Regulators also believe there is considerable potential for a more co-ordinated approach to 
intelligence sharing through the establishment of a Regulatory Intelligence Hub. While the 
pathfinders can help to illustrate the benefits of establishing a hub, developing a standard 
approach to intelligence sharing would help to avoid the creation of multiple dissimilar bilateral 
arrangements.  
The review has highlighted potential benefits of greater sharing of good practice between 
regulators, especially for non-business regulation, where the Better Regulation Executive has a 
limited remit. Some examples of good practice are described here, and others have arisen on a 
more bilateral and informal basis through contacts made in review workshops. We see value in 
building on this through a more formalised network of regulators.  
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While there are existing networks of economic and safety regulators, we consider that there would 
be value in a broader network. There is a good case for a small central unit (perhaps two to three 
full-time equivalents), reporting to a steering group of regulators, which would: 
 hold and develop knowledge and expertise around regulation (with a particular focus on 
non-business regulation), which is currently mostly developed in isolation;  
 be responsible for organising the development of a series of core training courses for 
regulators; 
 serve as the secretariat for the regulators’ network; 
 co-ordinate action on initiatives such as the Regulatory Intelligence Hub; and 
 possibly provide co-ordination of career development.  
We do not consider that at this stage there is a sufficient case for the development of a regulatory 
profession along the lines of, for example, the Government Economic Service or Government 
Finance Profession. 
Burdens on regulators 
We also considered whether government places undue burdens on regulators. These burdens 
are felt most strongly by small regulators, where a more proportionate approach would be merited 
to mitigate the impact. 
Summary of financial benefits 
With a large number of regulators in scope and differing levels of involvement, we have only been 
able to make high-level estimates of the financial effects of our proposals. We have made broad 
estimates for the three most significant proposals: full implementation of charging, increased use 
of regulated self-assurance and earned recognition, and greater intelligence sharing. 
In all cases full benefits would take some years to achieve. As well as the development work itself 
and a reasonable lead-in time for regulated entities to prepare, in some cases legislative change 
would be required. We believe full benefits might realistically be achieved by the end of 2020. 
Benefits of charging 
Our analysis of the 45 regulators for which we collected data indicates that of their total 
£2.54 billion combined annual spend on regulation, some £1.37 billion is grant funded. 
This potential gross Exchequer saving must then be reduced as some regulatory 
charging would recirculate public funds, with no net effect. We focused our analysis on 
the largest regulators where regulated self-assurance is possible and/or those where 
cross-charging of the public sector could be material. Such regulators account for 
£1 billion of grant funding and reducing this by the estimated value of cross-charging 
yields a potential Exchequer saving of £640 million. However, there will also be some 
cases where it will be undesirable to charge. On the other hand there will be some scope 
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among regulators that were not included in this data analysis. Taking the two 
countervailing influences into account, in our view, indicates a potential saving of at least 
£500 million.  
It is worth noting that our analysis excluded the impact of cross-charging for the purpose 
of developing an estimate of potential net Exchequer savings. There may be good 
reasons for publicly funded entities to be charged for regulation to incentivise good 
behaviour by the regulated. 
Benefits of charging 
Total regulatory 
budget 
Total government 
grant funding 
Grant funding 
analysed 
Estimated value 
of cross 
charging 
Potential 
reduction in 
Exchequer cost 
(£m) pa (£m) pa (£m) pa (£m) pa (£m) pa 
£2,540m pa £1,370m pa £1,000m pa £360m pa £640m pa 
Note: all figures rounded to nearest £10 million 
Benefits of increased self-assurance and earned recognition 
We also assessed the potential benefits of moving towards greater regulated self-
assurance. We analysed the activities of five of the largest six regulators, which tend to 
be those with the most inspection activities. In our judgement, based on the available 
evidence and the nature of the activities of the larger regulators, the potential savings are 
likely to be around 10% of their total costs, and hence of the order of £120 million. It 
should be noted that in the case of individual regulators the scope for savings might be 
significantly more or less than this average estimate of 10%. Extending this analysis to 
other regulators could lead to further potential savings.  
Benefits of increased self-assurance and earned recognition 
Total regulatory 
budget1 
Regulatory budget 
analysed 
Potential benefits Potential benefits 
(£m) pa (£m) pa (£m) pa (%) pa 
£2,540m pa £1,080m pa £120m pa 11% pa 
Note: all figures rounded to nearest £10 million or percentage point 
Two points must be emphasised about these estimated benefits.  
                                               
1  Regulatory spend comprises 45 of the 71 bodies identified as having some regulatory role and Local 
Authority spend for regulation (excluding housing, pest control, public conveniences and licensing). 
Data not readily available for RPA and EFA. 
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First, these are not necessarily (and in most cases will not be) net additional savings on 
top of Spending Review budget reductions. They show a mechanism by which these 
reductions can be achieved and made permanent.  
Secondly, they cannot be added to the potential income from charges to attain a total 
reduction in Exchequer costs. If there is total cost recovery through charging then the 
benefit of reductions in regulatory costs will pass through to regulated entities in line with 
the principles of ‘Managing Public Money’.2 
Benefits of increased intelligence sharing 
Regulators considered there to be a strong case for greater central co-ordination of 
intelligence sharing. This ranged from storing and maintaining data catalogues and 
centrally procured intelligence through to best practice and intelligence sharing research. 
The idea of a Regulatory Intelligence Hub, with a combined cross-department role for 
government, was seen as being a priority. Outline estimates suggest that savings in the 
order of £7.5 million per annum are achievable from such a concept.  
Implementation of recommendations 
This Regulatory Futures Review has been one of the most comprehensive reviews of regulatory 
practice since the Hampton Report in 2005, though with a rather different focus on exploring 
opportunities to make regulatory delivery more efficient. It has also been the first opportunity for 
the whole regulatory community to share and exchange their developing approaches and 
good practice.  
The review should therefore be seen as the start of a journey to involve regulators themselves in 
developing and improving the set of regulatory models employed by government. Making this 
happen is the responsibility of the regulators concerned and their sponsor departments. We set 
out below the recommendations, responsibilities and suggested timescales. 
We recommend that regulators and their sponsor departments should respond on how far 
and how fast they can move on the two changes envisaged here: a presumption of a move to 
greater regulated self-assurance and earned recognition underpinned by full-cost recovery 
charging for regulatory activities. 
As some of the above would require legislative change we recommend that government should 
reflect on the impact on policy and set out a definite way forward for implementation. Government 
should also consider further ideas such as companies or sectors having a ‘right to challenge’ 
regulators by setting out how they propose they might provide their own assurance model within 
the broad framework of regulated self-assurance and earned recognition. 
We recommend that regulators as a group should take forward the pathfinder projects for 
intelligence sharing in relation to farm inspections and labour market and establish a working 
group to report back in six months on the feasibility, scope and funding mechanism of a 
                                               
2  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/454191/ 
Managing_Public_Money_AA_v2_-jan15.pdf 
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Regulatory Intelligence Hub. Alongside this, a working group of regulators should take forward 
the idea of establishing a small central hub to encourage development and the sharing of 
regulatory models and good practice. 
We recommend that the Better Regulation Executive together with regulators should consider 
and report back within six months as to how burdens placed on smaller regulators might be made 
more proportionate. 
We recommend that regulators should move as far as practicable towards an outcome-based 
approach to regulation. Regulators should also consider how such a change would affect the level 
and nature of their engagement with regulated companies. We further recommend that 
regulators should periodically (around every five years) review their regulatory approach, with a 
view to stripping back accumulations of excessive standards and process controls. We also 
recommend that all regulators should consider how far they can make use of other agents who 
can bring influence to bear on minimising harm and improving the quality of services as part of 
their regulatory strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The Regulatory Futures Review was instigated by the Minister for the Cabinet Office as 
the first of a series of functional reviews of public bodies and executive agencies in 
December 2015 as part of the Public Bodies Reform strategy.  
1.2. Unlike the Triennial Reviews carried out in the last Parliament, this Review covered a 
large number of bodies (over 70 were potentially in scope) and was directed and carried 
out by the regulators themselves. The Review was directed by a steering group which 
comprised: 
 Amanda Spielman (Chair): Chair, Ofqual;  
 Judith Hackitt: Chair, Health and Safety Executive (until March 2016); 
 Graham Turnock: Director, Better Regulation Executive; 
 Philip Graf: Chair, Gambling Commission; 
 Paul Kirby: Non-Executive Director, Cabinet Office; 
 Lesley Ann Nash: Director, Public Bodies Reform Cabinet Office; 
 Chris Banks: Chair, Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education; Chair, Public 
Chairs Forum; 
 John Alty: Chief Executive, Intellectual Property Office (until Aug 2016); Chair, 
Association of Chief Executives; 
 Gillian Pratt: Director, Environment Agency; and 
 Rod Ainsworth: Director, Food Standards Agency. 
Other initiatives and reviews which had overlap with the Regulatory 
Futures Review  
1.3. Whilst the Review was taking place, there were a number of other initiatives that were 
ongoing where desired outcomes overlapped with those of the Review. Wherever 
possible, the Review team sought to work alongside other initiatives to minimise 
duplication. These initiatives have influenced the scope of the Review. We highlight below 
the principal examples of these initiatives and the impact on the Review. 
1.4. Some departments have been preparing transformation plans which naturally affect a 
number of regulators potentially in scope of this review. The Review has therefore sought 
to keep departments updated as to the progress and overall direction of travel for the 
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Review. We interacted with the Government Digital (GDS) to link up with initiatives 
involved in the ‘tell us once’ principle.  
1.5. Both the Better Regulation Executive and the Regulatory Delivery Office have sought to 
tackle aspects of the Review in initiatives that have concluded or are ongoing. The 
Review team has engaged with both teams throughout the Review to ensure that where 
possible a collaborative solution can be delivered. 
Approach to which bodies were in scope, and varying levels 
of participation 
1.6. The Review in theory covered all regulators which satisfied the definition of a regulator 
as set out in the Better Regulation Executive definition of a statutory regulator: 
 a function under any enactment of imposing requirements, restrictions or conditions, 
setting standards in relation to any activity or guidance relating to other regulatory 
activities; and/or 
 a function which relates to the securing of compliance with, or the enforcement of, 
requirements, restrictions, conditions, standards or guidance which is under or by 
virtue of any enactments relating to any activity. 
Sometimes the term ‘regulation’ is used more narrowly to include only entities that can 
enforce, but we have deliberately adopted the wider definition and so have included 
purely inspection bodies such as HMI Probation. 
1.7. At an early stage we excluded some regulators from active consideration for a variety of 
reasons such as: 
 they had recently been established or subject to review (e.g. Financial Conduct 
Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority); 
 they were primarily, or entirely registration bodies (e.g. Intellectual Property Office, 
and DVLA); or 
 they were part of a Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy-led 
review of economic regulators and there was a desire to avoid them being over-
reviewed. 
1.8. In other cases departments, or the regulators themselves, felt that because of other 
initiatives which were current in terms of departmental transformation plans (for instance 
at the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs), changes in the nature of the 
body occurring in the course of the Review (the proposals for HEFCE and OFFA 
becoming the Office for Students), or reviews of the individual body taking place at the 
same time (for instance at the Homes and Communities Agency) that the extent of their 
involvement in the Review might be reduced. 
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1.9. In addition, as potentially 70+ bodies were in scope of the Review some bodies only 
received our data information request and were not subject to further review either 
because they were particularly small or were particularly specialised. We therefore 
focussed on 31 regulators in detail. In general it is the data for these regulators which is 
presented (where the focus is on a different sized group of regulators this fact is 
highlighted). As a result the degree of scrutiny between regulators varied. The review did 
not look at regulators established by the Devolved Administrations. 
1.10. The degree of contribution which regulatory bodies made to the Review also varied and 
included one, or more, of: 
 financial contributions to the costs of the Review; 
 providing staff to carry out fieldwork and/or lead particular work-streams; 
 being a member of the steering group; 
 leading or presenting at Review workshops; 
 attending workshops; 
 submitting returns to the initial information request; 
 taking part in structured interviews in the course of the Review; and 
 assistance in estimating the potential benefits of the conclusions and 
recommendations of the Review. 
1.11. Financial contributions to the costs of the Review were received from: Food Standards 
Authority, Gambling Commission, Homes and Communities Agency, Health and Safety 
Executive, Information Commissioner’s Office, Insolvency Service, Intellectual Property 
Office, Ofqual, Ofsted, and The Pensions Regulator. 
1.12. The following regulators provided staff to carry out fieldwork and/or lead particular work-
streams: Gambling Commission, Health and Safety Executive / Health and Safety 
Laboratory and Ofsted. The following regulators led or presented at Review workshops: 
Care Quality Commission, Food Standards Authority, Gambling Commission, Ofgem, 
Ofqual, Ofsted, NHS Improvement and Professional Standards Agency for Health & 
Social Care. 
1.13. There were three stated objectives of the Review: 
 identify opportunities to achieve significant improvements in operating efficiency by 
reviewing functions across the sector, looking particularly at the experience of 
businesses and consumers affected by regulation; 
 identify the sources of burdens on regulators themselves; the opportunities to reduce 
those burdens and hence to reduce cost, complexity and delays in regulation; and 
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 develop a taxonomy of effective regulatory delivery models that makes it possible to 
extend the work of this review across all regulators. 
1.14. The Review took the view that its terms of reference did not include considering whether 
regulation is required at all nor what the regulation itself should be, as that was seen as 
relating to regulatory policy. Instead we considered how regulators can operate better 
within the existing set of regulations.  
1.15. Following feedback from regulators, the Review team also took a decision at an early 
stage to focus attention on the ‘front office’ functions of the regulators, which was the 
justification for the cross-functional review, rather than to consider ‘back office’ functions 
which had been, and were, the subject of other efficiency initiatives. 
1.16. Due to the nature of the participation of the bodies and the large number of regulators 
potentially in scope, the approach the Review team took was to examine a number of 
themes which would potentially have applicability across a wide range of regulators, 
rather than to make very specific recommendations concerning particular regulators. 
1.17. The rest of this report is structured around these themes as follows: 
Section 2: The regulatory landscape 
Section 3: Current regulatory practice and challenges 
Section 4: The regulatory future 
Section 5: Government setting high-level principles: outcome-based regulation 
Section 6: Increased use of regulated self-assurance and earned recognition 
Section 7: Cost recovery 
Section 8: Intelligence and data sharing 
Section 9: Developing expertise within regulators 
Section 10: Burdens on regulators 
Section 11: The potential benefits of our proposals 
Section 12: Conclusions and recommendations 
1.18. This report represents the views of the steering group. We engaged extensively with a 
wide range of regulators and discussed our emerging conclusions with them. Their input 
significantly influenced these conclusions and recommendations and had their broad 
support, although inevitably individual regulators may not necessarily agree with every 
single recommendation. We propose that how these recommendations could and should 
be applied to individual regulators and departments will be now for regulators (either 
individually or collectively), their sponsor departments, the Cabinet Office and 
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy to take forward. 
 
Regulatory Futures Review: The regulatory landscape | 13 
 
 
2. The regulatory landscape 
2.1. The regulatory landscape is diverse and can be classified in a number of ways to help 
draw conclusions. Figure 1 shows the differing size of the regulators by expenditure. 
Figure 1: Overview of regulators by regulatory spend and department classification 
in 2015 
 
Source: Public Bodies 2015, Regulatory Futures Review data collection, desk research and RFR 
analysis 
Note: Data excludes LA spend for regulation. Data not readily available for RPA and EFA 
2.2. Drawing on data returns and initial meetings with the regulators we sought to classify the 
regulatory bodies according to three categories (which are summarised in Figures 2a, 2b 
and 2c): 
 Who is regulated?  
 Who is protected? 
 The standards used for regulation. 
APHA 
£154m
CQC £249m
CC 
£22m
CAA 
£82.784m
DVSA 
£190m
EA £330m
FRC 
£33.7m
FSA
£134m
HSE £233m
MHRA
£107m
NHSI £121.5m
ONR 
£64m
ORR 
£28.87
Ofsted £165.8m
TPR £80m
PSA £3.43m
Ofqual £16.5m
IS £0.6m
LSB £3.6m
SIA £20.25m
GLA £4.24m
HEFCE £25m
GC £22m
ICO £22.08m
HCA £13.5m
VMD £12m
NMRO £9m
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Figure 2a: Classification of regulatory bodies: Who is regulated? 
 
As might be expected, the majority of regulators regulate businesses, but many also 
regulate different types of organisations in the form of ‘not for profit’ entities and/or 
providers of public services.  
There is also a high level of integration in terms of regulators of organisations 
(businesses, ‘not for profit’ or providers of public services) also regulating professionals. 
Note that the Financial Reporting Council, the Legal Services Board, and the Professional 
Standards Authority for Health and Social Care provide oversight of regulators who are 
responsible for regulation of the groups selected in the respective lines above. 
Name Economic 
regulators
Businesses Not 
for 
Profit
Providers 
of public 
services
Machinery 
of 
Governmen
t
Individuals - 
Professionals
Animal and Plant Health Agency Y
Care Quality Commission Y Y Y
Charity Commission for England and Wales Y
Civil Aviation Authority Y Y Y
Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) Y Y Y
Education Funding Agency Y Y Y
Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate Y
Environment Agency Y
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Y Y
Food Standards Agency Y Y Y Y
Gambling Commission Y Y Y Y
Gangmasters Licensing Authority Y Y
Health and Safety Executive Y Y Y Y
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) Y Y Y
HM Inspectorate of Probation Y
Homes and Communities Agency Y Y Y
Information Commissioner’s Office Y Y Y Y Y
Insolvency Service Y Y
Legal Services Board Y Y Y
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency Y Y Y Y
National Measurement and Regulation Office Y
NHS Improvement Y Y Y
Office of Nuclear Regulation Y Y Y
Office of Rail and Road Y Y Y Y Y
Ofqual Y Y
Ofsted Y
Pensions Regulator Y Y Y Y
Professional Standards Authority for Health & Social Care Y
Rural Payments Agency Y
Security Industry Authority Y
Veterinary Medicines Directorate Y Y Y Y
Who is regulated?
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Figure 2b: Classification of regulatory bodies: Who is protected? 
 
The majority of regulators seek to protect consumers and/or citizens, with some also 
involved in protecting businesses. It is worth noting that regulators’ responsibility for 
protecting these groups may not apply uniformly across each group as a whole when 
selected above. For example, regulators are normally interested in consumers of 
products and/or services arising within the sector they regulate rather than consumers as 
a whole. Similarly, a desire to protect citizens would be linked to the role citizens play in 
the area being regulated, for example whether they are acting as investors or employees. 
Name Economic 
regulators
Businesses Natural 
Resources
National 
Infrastructure
Consumers Citizens
Animal and Plant Health Agency Y Y Y Y
Care Quality Commission Y Y
Charity Commission for England and Wales Y
Civil Aviation Authority Y Y Y
Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) Y Y
Education Funding Agency Y
Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate Y
Environment Agency Y Y
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Y Y Y
Food Standards Agency Y Y Y
Gambling Commission Y Y
Gangmasters Licensing Authority Y Y
Health and Safety Executive Y Y Y
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) Y Y
HM Inspectorate of Probation Y
Homes and Communities Agency Y Y Y
Information Commissioner’s Office Y Y Y
Insolvency Service Y Y
Legal Services Board Y Y Y
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency Y Y
National Measurement and Regulation Office Y Y Y
NHS Improvement Y Y
Office of Nuclear Regulation Y Y Y Y
Office of Rail and Road Y Y Y Y Y
Ofqual Y
Ofsted Y Y
Pensions Regulator Y
Professional Standards Authority for Health & Social Care Y Y
Rural Payments Agency Y Y
Security Industry Authority Y Y
Veterinary Medicines Directorate Y Y Y Y
Who is protected?
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Figure 2c: Classification of regulatory bodies: Standards used for regulation 
 
While the previous two charts suggest that there are some regulators who seek to 
regulate similar groups and also seek to protect similar groups, this chart suggests that 
their methods vary significantly. This is partly a function of the (combination of) 
outcome(s) that regulators seek to attain. 
2.3. Figures 2a, 2b and 2c show that there is no consistent pattern as to whether regulation 
is organised around: 
 industry (e.g. Civil Aviation Authority; Office of Rail and Road); 
 harm (e.g. Health and Safety Executive; Food Standards Agency); 
 product standard (e.g. Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency); 
 service standard by entity (e.g. Care Quality Commission Ofsted); 
 profession (e.g. Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care);  
 ethical standards (e.g. Human Tissue Authority); or  
 a combination of these (e.g. Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency covering 
individuals and entities; the Insolvency Service covering harm, profession and 
professional practice; the Financial Reporting Council covering standards, 
professionals and professional practices). 
Name Economic 
regulators
Professional 
standards
Service 
standards
Product 
standards
Operating 
standards
Environment
al standards
Pricing 
controls
Other 
controls
Animal and Plant Health Agency Y
Care Quality Commission Y
Charity Commission for England and Wales Y
Civil Aviation Authority Y Y Y
Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) Y Y Y Y
Education Funding Agency Y
Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate Y
Environment Agency Y Y
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Y Y
Food Standards Agency Y Y Y Y
Gambling Commission Y Y Y
Gangmasters Licensing Authority Y
Health and Safety Executive Y Y Y Y
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) Y
HM Inspectorate of Probation Y
Homes and Communities Agency Y Y Y
Information Commissioner’s Office Y
Insolvency Service Y Y
Legal Services Board Y Y Y
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency Y Y Y Y Y
National Measurement and Regulation Office Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NHS Improvement Y Y Y
Office of Nuclear Regulation Y
Office of Rail and Road Y Y Y Y Y
Ofqual Y Y Y Y
Ofsted Y
Pensions Regulator Y Y Y
Professional Standards Authority for Health & Social Care Y
Rural Payments Agency Y Y
Security Industry Authority Y
Veterinary Medicines Directorate Y Y Y
Standards used for regulation
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2.4. In some cases regulatory activities have been combined with non-regulatory activities. 
 the Environment Agency has substantial regulatory activities in relation to industrial 
installations, waste, water quality and abstraction, and inland fishing, but also has 
responsibility for flood prevention work; 
 the Rural Payments Agency has responsibility for payments to farmers and other 
parties under the Common Agricultural Policy but also for livestock identification and 
traceability to aid prevention and management of animal diseases; and 
 NHS Improvement is the operational name for the organisation that brings together 
Monitor, NHS Trust Development Authority, Patient Safety, the National Reporting 
and Learning System, the Advancing Change team and the Intensive Support teams. 
NHS Improvement contains the regulatory activities exercised by Monitor, alongside 
wider improvement activities, building on improvement activities delivered by its 
legacy organisations. 
The precise current combination of functions is often a product of history and convenience 
as much as logic. In many cases the precise form of the regulator has been determined 
by specific past events which have led government to take action.  
Examples 
The Sports Ground Safety Authority was formed following the Hillsborough Disaster in 1989. It has 
statutory responsibility to oversee local authority regulation of safety at 94 major football grounds, and 
also issues licences to admit spectators directly to those grounds. 
The Human Tissue Authority (HTA) was established following events in the 1990s that revealed a 
culture in hospitals of removing and retaining human organs and tissue without consent. 
The HTA now regulate organisations that remove, store, and use human tissue for a number of purposes, 
including research, medical treatment, post-mortem examination, education and training, and for display 
in public. They are also responsible for approving organ and bone marrow donation from living people. 
The primary focus of the HTA has always been to ensure that human organs and tissue are used safely, 
ethically, and with proper consent, assuring the public that their wishes will be respected. 
The sector-specific Office of Rail and Road was established to take on some of the rail-safety functions 
previously regulated by the HSE following concerns after the Ladbroke Grove and Hatfield rail disasters. 
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) was also separated from HSE and established as a stand-
alone public corporation. This provided ONR with greater operational flexibility, easing the recruitment of 
nuclear specialists and providing a greater focus on nuclear skills and expertise given the planned nuclear 
new build programme and the associated role of the ONR in Generic Design Assessment approval for 
new nuclear reactors. 
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2.5. Indeed, while there have been a number of mergers of regulators since 2010, with the 
creation of regulators such as the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) from the 
Drivers Standards Agency (DSA) and the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency 
(VOSA), and the Animal and Plant Health Agency from the Animal Health and Veterinary 
Laboratories Agency and parts of the Food and Environment Research Agency (Fera), 
there have probably been as many cases of creation of new regulators such as the Office 
of Nuclear Regulation, and the Oil and Gas Authority. 
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3. Current regulatory practice and challenges 
3.1. There has been a series of initiatives over the years which have sought to improve 
regulation of the private sector. Following deregulatory moves under the Conservative 
Government to 1997, the Labour Government sought to improve the practice of regulation 
with initiatives such as the Better Regulation Task Force set up in 1997, the Better 
Regulation Executive, and then the Hampton Report3 and Macrory Review4 which 
resulted in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008.  
3.2. These were followed by the One-in, One-Out (later One-In, Two-Out) initiative under the 
2010 to 2015 Coalition government which delivered savings to business worth £10 billion 
over the Parliament. It was supported by: 
 Red Tape Challenge and Focus on Enforcement reviews which took a sectoral 
approach to identifying how to reduce the impact of regulation on business; 
 the upgrading of the long-standing statutory code of practice for regulators which 
gives effect to the Hampton principles of regulation; and 
 legislation creating a duty for regulators to have regard to the desirability of economic 
growth. 
The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 required future governments 
to set a Business Impact Target (BIT) for the impact of regulation on business over the 
lifetime of a Parliament. 
3.3. The Conservative Government from 2015 had a more explicit deregulatory agenda, with 
a manifesto commitment to make a further £10 billion of regulatory savings for business 
(which is the BIT of the 2015 to 2020 Parliament). This is being delivered through: 
 regulatory budgets for departments, which take account of the impact of changes in 
policy and practice by the regulators which they sponsor as well as legislative 
changes; and  
 Cutting Red Tape reviews, the successors of the Red Tape Challenge and Focus on 
Enforcement. 
3.4. As a result of this constant focus on seeking to improve regulation, UK regulation is 
generally seen as best practice worldwide as recognised by, for example, OECD reviews 
                                               
3  http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.bis.gov.uk/policies/better-regulation/improving- 
regulatory-delivery/assessing-our-regulatory-system 
4  http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121212135622/http:/www.bis.gov.uk/files/file44593.pdf 
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of regulatory practice.5 In our discussions with business representative organisations 
there was recognition of the efforts governments have made to improve the practice of 
regulation. As a result regulation is a less frequent cause of complaint from their 
members. At the same time they still argued that there is a lot more that could be done 
to improve regulatory practice.  
3.5. Current best practice as set out in the Regulators’ Code emphasises a number of key 
aspects: 
 an emphasis on provision of advice and information to facilitate and encourage 
compliance rather than inspection and enforcement; 
 a risk-based approach to regulation and inspection and, where possible, a ‘no blame’ 
approach to encourage reporting of non-compliance; and  
 greater information and intelligence sharing and collaboration between regulators. 
3.6. Much of the pressure for improvement in regulatory practice has been driven by top-down 
initiatives in the past. This review, led by the regulators, is an opportunity for regulators 
themselves to contribute their extensive knowledge and experience to how regulation 
might be improved operationally. 
3.7. In addition, in public services, regulatory practice is rather less mature and cross-country 
comparisons are less developed due to the very different structures, ownership and 
means of funding public services between countries. Indeed, in the UK, public services 
have been subject to frequent change as government sees it as being more its 
responsibility to secure improvements in public services than it does in the private sector 
where its aim is more (though not entirely) directed towards compliance. 
3.8. Devolution has meant that there is both greater diversity in the structure of public services 
and also in the nature of regulation. For example, in a centrally-run health service without 
a purchaser/provider split (as in Scotland), whilst there still is the need for an inspectorate 
(Healthcare Improvement Scotland) along the lines of CQC, there is no need for an 
economic regulator (or a financial monitoring organisation) as performed by Monitor 
in England.  
3.9. As a result, within some areas of public services, notably health and education, regulators 
have more often been subject to government policy objectives shifting and changing the 
context of regulation, than has been the case in the private sector. In this review our focus 
on public services is in relation to England. 
3.10. There are other influences which have had, or will have, a strong impact on 
regulatory practice. 
                                               
5  http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/44912041.pdf 
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Constraints on public spending 
3.11. With a few notable exceptions, such as the Office of Nuclear Regulation and the Care 
Quality Commission, regulators, like most of the public sector, have been required to 
make reductions in public expenditure in the recent past. In the case of most regulators 
this will continue in the period to 2020. This review will not necessarily identify additional 
savings which can be made. Rather, in many cases it may simply identify approaches 
regulators may use to achieve these target reductions. 
The impact of withdrawal from the European Union 
3.12. The referendum vote to withdraw from the European Union occurred towards the end of 
the Review. Consideration has been given to the impact that this might have for the 
conclusions of the Review, particularly as EU regulation was one of the issues in debate 
between the two sides of the Referendum campaign.  
3.13. Once the future desired relationship between the UK and the EU is secured issues for 
regulation such as: 
 the status of the UK in relation to the Single Market; 
 free movement of labour; and 
 labour market regulations more generally,  
will be known. 
3.14. The extent to which the UK Government will seek to revise some non-Single Market 
regulations such as environmental regulations is to be negotiated.  
3.15. The United Kingdom will in due course be leaving the European Union. The formal 
negotiations will determine the precise arrangements that will determine the new 
regulatory environment. The Government has stated it will introduce a Great Repeal Bill 
to remove the European Communities Act from the statute book and convert the body of 
existing EU law into domestic law. Parliament will then be free to amend, repeal and 
improve any law it chooses. In that context, we have assumed for the purpose of the 
Review that any substantive regulatory impact will be from 2020 at the earliest - and 
hence beyond a likely timescale for implementation of this Review’s main 
recommendations. Indeed we hope that some of the principles laid down in this Review 
may help in considering how future regulations might best be drafted to aid their 
implementation. However, for those regulators whose work will be most influenced by 
withdrawal from the EU, there may be re-allocation of management focus, and so 
implementation of this Review’s recommendations may take longer. 
3.16. There will be some very specific impacts on some regulators, for example the Medicines 
and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) and its relationship with the 
London-based European Medicines Agency, but not to the extent that it would affect the 
validity and ease of implementation of the Review’s recommendations. Indeed, some 
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recommendations may be easier to implement. For example, there has been some 
uncertainty in the Food Standards Agency as to whether self-assurance in abattoirs 
would be permissible under existing EU regulations.  
Recent research on regulatory best practice 
3.17. There has been a range of academic work on regulation which has informed the 
development of regulatory practice.6 For example, the Ayres and Braithwaite enforcement 
pyramid has had a significant influence on stressing that enforcement action should 
generally be a last resort in terms of ensuring regulatory compliance. The UK Regulators’ 
Code7 and OECD Best Practice Regulatory Principles8 have drawn on this academic work 
and both stress that regulation should be risk-based. There has been continued academic 
research into models that minimise the hands-on assurance role of the state. One such 
model is ‘meta-regulation’ which involves government rather than regulating directly, 
encouraging industry to put in place its own systems of internal control, which are then 
scrutinised by regulators.  
3.18. Perhaps the most recent new development is the work of Christopher Hodges (Hodges, 
2016) summarised in a paper for the Better Regulation Delivery Office (BRDO).9 Hodges 
takes an approach which draws on empirical evidence from behavioural psychology 
(rather than economics) and regulatory practice to propose a more collaborative 
approach in the UK between businesses, their stakeholders and public officials, based 
on a shared ethical approach.  
3.19. In particular he argues that: 
 effective regulation should be viewed as producing desirable behaviour by the people 
involved; and  
 businesses should be encouraged to adopt ethical practice and regulatory systems 
and actions should support and incentivise this. 
3.20. Hodges argues that enforcement policies should generally avoid the concept of 
deterrence, since it has limited effect on behaviour and conflicts with a learning-based 
performance culture. Where sanctions are imposed, the totality of sanctions should be 
proportionate to the degree of moral culpability involved. 
                                               
6  For example see ‘The Oxford Handbook of Regulation’ edited by Baldwin, R., Cave, M., & Lodge, M. 
(2010) Oxford University Press 
7  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/300126/14-705-
regulators-code.pdf 
8  http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/governance-of-regulators.htm 
9  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/497539/16-113-
ethical-business-regulation.pdf 
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3.21. Hodges believes that adoption of a robust and evidenced ethical business regulatory 
system would enable the regulatory architecture to be rationalised. He argues that the 
implications for UK regulators are that the architecture should consist of: 
 high-level general principles (provided by the national regulator), which can be seen 
as akin to outcome based regulation; and 
 provision of detail at a lower (potentially non-regulator) tier, for example in guidance 
at sectoral (trade association), internal (group or corporate), or area (Chambers of 
Commerce for SMEs) level. 
3.22. This general approach has received endorsement from the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life who, in their report ‘Striking the balance - upholding the 7 principles of public 
life in regulation’,10 recommended that best practice in regulation is that “regulators should 
actively engage with those they regulate and take a leadership role by encouraging 
positive attitudes towards compliance”. 
3.23. This proposed architecture has influenced our proposals for what we have termed 
‘regulated self-assurance’. However our proposals vary this architecture by using third 
parties and assurance bodies in addition to regulated entities for assurance tasks. 
3.24. Furthermore, we recognise that government will still be ultimately responsible for 
regulation and therefore will still supervise this self-assurance. They may still need to 
retain an assurance role in certain circumstances - such as where there is a high number 
of very small firms or a high level of criminality. 
                                               
10  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/striking-the-balance-upholding-the-7-principles-in-
regulation 
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4. The regulatory future 
4.1. While there is much that is good in UK regulatory practice, there is scope for 
improvement. Currently regulators are operating in a context where they are being 
required to make, in many cases, year on year reductions in expenditure. Hence no 
change is not an option and one of the objectives of this review requires us to identify 
how regulators can achieve significant improvements in operational efficiency. 
4.2. Areas in which regulators think there is scope for improvement include: 
 an even greater focus on outcome based regulation than there is currently; 
 a shift in the expectations of what regulators can and should do and what businesses 
and others such as purchasers/commissioners and professionals should do to 
ensure, not just compliance, but steady reduction in the risk of harm and/or 
improvement in the quality of services. The interaction of these roles is summarised 
in the graphic equaliser model (summarised below); 
 greater harnessing of data, surveys and use of regulated entities’ own quality 
management systems to reduce (though probably never entirely remove) the need 
for physical inspection; and 
 greater sharing of information and intelligence between regulators and other 
public bodies. 
The graphic equaliser model 
The Care Quality Commission uses a conceptual framework, ‘the graphic equaliser model’, which we 
have found particularly useful (presented in Figure 3). This outlines a set of five stakeholders who can 
each act as levers of influence and take responsibility for quality in the health and social care sector. The 
extent of the role each plays will vary between sectors but also over time depending on the particular 
circumstance and challenges facing the sector. 
This framework can be generalised so that it applies to the private sector more generally, where the 
commissioner/user combined is the purchaser. According to economic theory, one of the justifications for 
regulation is when there is asymmetry of information between the purchaser and the provider. This can 
be particularly the case where the purchaser is an individual. Hence the more informed the purchaser the 
less the need for a regulator to be involved in the purchaser/provider relationship. In principle, the more 
a purchaser can be an active lever for quality, the less that action is required from the regulator. 
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Figure 3: Care Quality Commission stakeholder equaliser 
 
4.3. Currently, in some cases, too much of the responsibility falls by default on the regulator 
and too little on the regulated entity, the commissioners or the professionals working in 
the entity. This can be addressed through legal means or through seeking to emphasise 
this in the values of the entities concerned. 
4.4. In other cases the regulator may be duplicating the assurance which the regulated entity 
or the purchasers are carrying out themselves. For example, in the case of food safety, 
large supermarkets will already make use of quality-management systems to assure food 
hygiene and currently both local authorities (on behalf of the FSA) and BRC Global 
Standards (on behalf of retailers who are the purchasers) assure that food manufacturers 
meet food safety standards.  
4.5. In such cases there may be scope for the regulator to rely more on assurance being 
provided by, or on behalf of, the regulated entity themselves (suitably audited), or by 
purchasers or professionals, rather than doing duplicate assurance themselves. We set 
out a number of examples below of areas where this already happens.  
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Purchasers taking responsibility for their supply chain: Red Tractor scheme 
This was established following the salmonella, E-coli and BSE scares in the 1980s and 1990s. Food 
retailers sought to ensure greater control over their supply-chain standards as food hygiene issues among 
their suppliers can lead to brand damage for retailers and costs associated with product recall. 
Establishing a scheme of third-party assurance avoids farms being inspected by multiple retailers. The 
scheme is owned jointly by the National Farmers Union and the British Retail Consortium. More recently 
the Food Standards Agency recognised that it could use this assurance scheme to inform its own risk 
assessments when deciding on frequency of inspection. 
Red Tractor (and associated assurance schemes such as the Agricultural Industries Confederation and 
BRC Global Standards) does assurance from farm to processing, covering some of the regulatory controls 
within the scope of FSA, local authorities, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) and Environment 
Agency (EA), through certification bodies who compete to assure farms etc. Farms negotiate fees and 
membership with certification bodies. Red Tractor covers around 80% of farming production. As a result, 
Red Tractor assured farms are less likely to be inspected in any single year (2% compared to 25% for 
non-Red Tractor assured farms), with the result that inspections can be better targeted and their number 
reduced. 
 
Companies self-reporting: Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) 
Currently the DWI operates a system of self-reporting which involves water companies testing drinking 
water themselves with their own processes, sampling and testing all assured by UKAS assured 
certification bodies and reporting results to the DWI. Companies have a statutory obligation to report on 
incidents concerning the quality of the drinking water which the DWI then investigates. In this case 
therefore the assurance is all done by the companies themselves under the supervision of the regulator. 
 
Companies self-reporting: Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
RIDDOR (The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013) place a 
legal duty on the relevant duty holder, normally the employer, to report injuries at work to the HSE. 
 
Professions taking responsibility: Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Authority (MHRA) 
The MHRA operates a ‘yellow card’ system where doctors have a (voluntary) responsibility to report if 
there is an adverse reaction arising from the use of a particular medicine or medical device, in order to 
identify where particular medicines or combination of medicines are having an adverse impact. 
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Professions taking responsibility: Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
Pilots and air traffic controllers have a statutory responsibility to report any near misses (proximity events) 
to the CAA, on a ‘no blame basis’. 
 
4.6. A similar framework might be used in cases where regulation seeks to protect the provider 
against the purchaser. Here the regulator might make use of other agents to help ensure 
compliance and/or avoid duplication of assurance. For example, could developers or 
insurers be used more to encourage high standards of health and safety in construction?  
4.7. In other cases it may be that other agents make use of the assurance provided by the 
regulator. For example, it is said that lenders to private registered providers of social 
housing (commonly referred to as housing associations) take reassurance from the 
regulation of housing associations by the Homes and Communities Agency which is a 
contributory factor in the cost of funds to the sector. 
4.8. The role of insurers and purchasers and that of the regulator can become self-reinforcing. 
For example there is evidence that food hygiene ratings are starting to be taken into 
account by corporate and individual purchasers of food and by insurers when determining 
insurance premiums. The DVSA, in developing an earned recognition scheme for heavy 
goods vehicle and public service vehicle operator licence holders, is looking to 
commercial pressures through purchasers of transport services and insurers to 
encourage transport operators to join the scheme.  
4.9. However, for roles to be appropriately allocated it is important that the economic costs of 
the various assurance activities are transparent and the allocation of tasks fully taken into 
account. For this reason we believe there should be a presumption of full-cost recovery 
for regulatory services - an issue which we consider further in Section 8. 
4.10. We recommend that all regulators consider how far they can make use of other agents 
who can bring influence to bear on minimising harm and improving the quality of services 
as part of their regulatory strategy. This will help to minimise oversight and, in the case 
of regulation of public services, ensure that the most appropriate public body is 
responsible for each element of assurance. 
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5. Government setting high-level principles: 
outcome-based regulation 
5.1. The first part of our proposed approach to regulation (described in Section 4) involves the 
regulator being very clear about the outcome they are seeking to achieve and focusing 
on what high-level outcomes the regulated entity is required to achieve rather than on 
failure to comply with detailed rules. This approach is consistent with the Hampton 
principles. 
5.2. The extent to which detailed rules are required to ensure compliance with the outcome 
will vary between types of regulation. For example, where the outcome is to ensure that 
purchasers get what they think they are paying for (trade descriptions regulation), or 
where the outcome is expressed in quantitative terms (e.g. restrictions on carbon 
emissions of power generation plants), there is more of a simple pass/fail in terms 
of compliance. 
5.3. However, where the regulation is designed to minimise the risk of harm, the outcome may 
be rather more subjective. For example, in ‘ensuring a safe working environment’ the 
standard expected may change over time, whereas regulation focused on a process may 
not. The measure of whether sufficient steps have been taken to avoid harm generally 
relies on the principle that the risk of harm is ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (the 
ALARP11 principle). In such a case costs should not be ‘grossly disproportionate to further 
risk reduction’. Hence the judgement as to what is reasonably practicable can change 
over time. 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
The work of the HSE is outcome-based, addressing problems by matching a mixed set of interventions 
tailored to specific risks in different sector circumstances. This includes both direct and indirect 
interventions. Their new strategy, ‘Helping Great Britain work well’, encourages others to take 
responsibility for a common-sense approach to health and safety in the workplace. 
 
                                               
11  http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpglance.htm  
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Gambling Commission 
The Gambling Commission is seeking to encourage a conversation with gambling operators about how 
responsible gambling can be promoted. It is communicating to industry that it needs to invest in different 
forms of research and data analytics in order to improve outcomes for vulnerable gamblers, and to use 
information they collect for commercial purposes for social responsibility reasons. There is a recognition 
that different businesses will take different approaches and that, in piloting such programmes, there will 
be successes and failures. The Commission’s focus is on ensuring that innovation in this area is 
effectively evaluated with learning shared across the industry. Given that the data and systems involved 
in identifying potential problems in gambling are often the same ones used by gambling operators for 
commercial purposes, there are some challenges in getting operators to share this information. 
The Gambling Commission is also trialling different ways to encourage the industry to be more 
responsible for meeting the outcomes required, including engaging with larger operators at board level 
and putting the onus onto operators to demonstrate how they are embedding systems to meet licensing 
objectives. Operators are keen to have intended outcomes clearly stated to give them confidence that 
they are reaching them, or what steps they need to take to do so. 
 
5.4. In principle, good public policy prefers a focus on outcomes to a focus on outputs, 
processes or inputs. Outcome-based regulation can be flexible to technological and 
market changes including reduced barriers to new entrants - important in fast changing 
industries, where implementation of detailed regulations can have the effect of 
suppressing innovation. It can also reduce the resources required by the regulator for 
inspections/investigations which were confirmed by the Review information collection 
exercise to be the most significant area of current regulator activity. 
5.5. A further advantage of outcome-based regulation is that as long as the intent is clear it 
avoids the risk that regulated bodies are focused on strict compliance with rules rather 
than the desired outcome.  
Experience of rules based systems: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
(Ofgem) 
Ofgem have learned that rules-based systems have a number of problems: 
Any rule can be subverted. Suppliers attempted to get around rules requiring them to make clear to 
customers whether they are on the cheapest tariff through use of ‘white label’ or collective switch deals.  
Focus on the rules not the outcome. One supplier argued that a strict application of the rules would 
require a 20-minute introduction every time they were on a sales call to a customer. 
Rules can get in the way of innovation The restriction to four tariffs per supplier restricted innovation 
in terms of offering local deals to community energy supply companies (whilst derogations were allowed 
these took time to attain). 
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5.6. The potential downsides are that it might provide insufficient certainty to business and 
potentially insufficient legal clarity to the regulated as to whether they are meeting 
regulators’ requirements. This can be addressed through the concept of safe harbour, or 
a ‘sandbox’.  
5.7. The concept of a regulatory sandbox as used by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
aims to create a ‘safe space’ in which businesses can test innovative products, services, 
business models and delivery mechanisms in a live environment without immediately 
incurring all the normal regulatory consequences of engaging in the activity in question 
and as such it also mitigates this uncertainty. In the FCA case, the sandbox is useful for 
authorised firms looking for clarity around applicable rules before testing an idea that 
does not easily fit into the existing regulatory framework and for unauthorised firms that 
need to become authorised before being able to test their innovation in a live 
environment. 
5.8. It may also be the case that, due to the particular circumstances of a regulated sector, 
focusing purely on a single outcome will be inadequate to protect those that the regulation 
is seeking to protect. For example the Pensions Regulator has objectives: 
 to protect the benefits of members of occupational pension schemes;  
 to reduce the risk of situations arising which may lead to compensation being payable 
from the Pension Protection Fund; and  
 to minimise any adverse impact on the sustainable growth of an employer. 
5.9. Given the uncertainties and timescales over which outcomes are achieved in pensions, 
regulating this sector in simple outcome terms is problematic. The Pensions Regulator’s 
objectives may sometimes come into conflict, which requires the Pensions Regulator to 
then strike a balance in the specific case before it. For example, the requirement to 
protect the benefits of pension scheme members - which might point towards requiring 
an employer to pay more into the pension scheme - and minimising any adverse impact 
on the employer’s sustainable growth. 
5.10. There is the constant need for vigilance on the part of regulators to challenge the 
understandable pressure to introduce further conditions after specific incidents of 
wrongdoing by industry. We recommend that the regulator should review on a periodic 
basis (perhaps every five years) the extent to which its licences and regulatory practices 
adhere to the principle of outcome-based regulation and so ensure that regulatory creep 
has not occurred since the last review. 
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A case study of regulatory creep: Ofgem 
When energy supply licences were first introduced more than 10 years ago each supplier licence was 
approximately 160 pages long. A review to get rid of unnecessary and verbose conditions led to a shorter 
licence of approximately 60 pages. But now the licence is approximately 500 pages long! Approximately 
200 of these pages were introduced by Ofgem in response to specific incidents of wrongdoing within the 
industry such as mis-selling and unauthorised doorstep sales. 
 
5.11. There is also a risk that even if the mandatory rules are outcome-based, guidance on 
what is behind a licence condition (or use of an external standard) which when followed 
provides an assured route to compliance (by supplying the certainty and legal clarity), 
can increasingly be seen as part of the rules. Ofgem highlighted that they have over 500 
documents on their website providing guidance on the meaning of licence conditions.  
5.12. There are legitimate concerns about how regulation affects small businesses and new 
entrants to a market. At one level the simpler the objective of regulation, the better for 
small businesses. However the more that there needs to be detailed guidance explaining 
what the regulation means, the more difficult it will be for small businesses and new 
entrants, because large businesses are more likely to have significant numbers of 
personnel who can liaise with and influence the regulator in providing guidance and/or be 
involved in joint industry/regulator working groups. For this reason, many regulators think 
that they should make particular efforts to provide information and advice to new entrants 
and small firms. Ofgem runs a small supplier forum for this reason. 
5.13. In the energy industry the ability of incumbent large suppliers to influence and help draw 
up complex industry and network codes (which can arguably be anti-competitive) was 
one of the issues addressed by the Competition and Markets Authority in its recent review 
of the energy market.  
5.14. Regulation based on outcomes, which then relies on ‘case law’ for interpretation of the 
outcome, risks favouring incumbent suppliers who will have a good corporate memory of 
how the regulation has been interpreted compared to new suppliers. This may require 
the regulator to be more responsive to new and small suppliers in providing information 
and to take such potential uncertain interpretation of the licence into account 
in enforcement. 
5.15. For outcome-based regulation to be more effective it will be important that the instinctive 
reaction of the government and/or regulators to any wrongdoing is not just to introduce 
more rules. Regulated companies need to have regard to the outcome desired by the 
regulator rather than simply adhering to rules. 
5.16. This requires regulators to be more challenging with the companies they regulate. For 
example the CAA in moving from a compliance-based approach towards a more 
performance-based approach involves greater challenge to a company on how they are 
performing. Ofwat meets non-executive directors of water companies prior to their 
appointment to explain to them their responsibilities as provider of a vital public service. 
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It also invites all non-executive directors to a six monthly meeting in which to share 
learning about how outcomes are delivered and to discuss current issues affecting 
the industry.  
5.17. This will require the regulator having more active and intelligent conversations at senior 
level (primarily executive but also non-executive) than in the past, and will require 
regulators who are more strategic and senior than those existing under more compliance-
based approaches. 
5.18. Despite the risks of an outcome-based approach, we recommend that regulators should 
move as far as practicable towards an outcome-based approach, with appropriate 
safeguards to ensure that new and small firms do not suffer as a result. Regulators should 
also consider how such a change should affect the nature of their engagement with 
regulated companies. 
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6. Increased use of regulated self-assurance 
and earned recognition 
6.1. While regulators should focus on outcomes we propose that there should be greater 
freedom for regulated businesses to self-assure either directly themselves or through the 
use of assurance bodies. In the case of publicly funded bodies such as schools and 
hospitals we use the term ‘earned recognition’ to acknowledge explicitly that the fact that 
they are publicly funded involves a slightly different rationale for inspection. In the case 
of some of the services regulated by CQC there is also the need to ensure user 
confidence in the quality of service. At a high level the case for an approach involving 
regulated self-assurance and earned recognition was set out in Section 4, ‘The regulatory 
future’, and in this section we examine it in more detail and consider some of the 
advantages and disadvantages. 
6.2. Figure 4 sets out how the scenarios of greater regulated self-assurance and earned 
recognition might work. Scenario 1 sets out how regulation currently works for some 
regulators where regulation and assurance is done directly by the regulator. Scenario 2 
sets out where the assurance is carried out by the regulated entity itself, the results of 
which may be reported to the regulator, or which are subject to challenge by the regulator. 
Scenario 3 sets out where the assurance is carried out by intermediary assurance or 
certification bodies. 
6.3. We propose that where feasible there should be movement towards scenarios 2 and 3. 
Whether this is feasible may depend on the structure of the industry, and in the case of 
publicly funded and provided entities a pure self-assurance model may not be desirable. 
Where there is a sector with a limited number of companies such as the water industry 
Scenario 2 alone may be feasible. In other sectors all three scenarios may apply with self 
-assurance being carried out by the largest entities, assurance by an intermediate body 
for most medium and small entities with the tail, and those who have a particularly poor 
record of compliance still being subject to direct regulation by the regulator. 
6.4. It is important to stress that what we are proposing is not self-regulation as it will still 
involve the regulator having a responsibility for ensuring that regulations are adhered to. 
Indeed some of the sectors which are regarded as heavily regulated such as the nuclear, 
drinking water and civil aviation industries are good examples of where such an approach 
being applied relies heavily on outcome based regulation and a lot of “no blame” 
self-reporting. Inspections by the regulator may still occur, particularly for those with 
a poor history of compliance and/or who do not have a satisfactory method of assurance 
in place.  
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Figure 4: Scenarios of split of regulatory activity 
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Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
The CAA is responsible for economic, safety, and environmental regulation of the aviation sector. Safety 
policy covers personnel, infrastructure, and aircraft, with rules determined with reference to European 
and UK legislation as appropriate. There is a responsibility on pilots and air traffic controllers to self-report 
near misses and incidents. The training and qualifications of pilots are managed by ‘approved entities’ 
which the CAA oversees rather than by the CAA itself. Aircraft maintenance schedules are submitted by 
the operator themselves and approved by the CAA and then audited by the CAA. European legislation 
allows a degree of earned autonomy in inspection regimes and the CAA is moving towards this. Hence 
the CAA is an example of a heavily regulated sector which relies heavily on self-reporting, approval and 
audit of airlines’ own safety management systems and allowing third party entities to assure the training 
and quality of pilots. 
 
6.5. Regulated self-assurance can work through a variety of mechanisms: 
 assurance schemes (e.g. Red Tractor);  
 industry-run registers (e.g. the Gas Safe scheme of registered gas engineers or 
FENSA the register of window installers);  
 regulator supervision of industry / professions’ self-regulation (e.g. Financial 
Reporting Council supervision of accountancy bodies);  
 accredited voluntary registration (e.g. the Professional Standards Authority 
accreditation of bodies like the British Acupuncture Council or the Association of Child 
Psychotherapists); and 
 company self-regulation (e.g. water companies are responsible for monitoring water 
quality and reporting adverse incidents, with every stage of the process being 
accredited, likewise medicines approval and testing). 
6.6. There can then be a number of different ways that this is implemented in practice: 
(a) Earned recognition 
Entities who demonstrate compliance with standards or who are accredited with 
an assurance scheme may earn recognition from regulators who reduce 
oversight and inspection visits. An example of this is the Red Tractor scheme, 
established by a number of farming industry and retailing bodies and described 
in Section 4.  
(b) Delegation of regulatory tasks 
In this case the assurance task is delegated either to the company itself or to an 
assurance body. For example, meat hygiene inspection in poultry plants can be 
carried out by the plant’s own plant inspection assistants rather than FSA-
employed Meat Hygiene Inspectors (MHIs). Under the Environment Agency’s Pig 
and Poultry Assurance Scheme if a farm is not a scheme member it is inspected 
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at least once a year by the Environment Agency who charge an annual 
subsistence fee of £2,490. A farm that is a member of the scheme is inspected 
by a Certification Body (CB). If the farm is also a member of another scheme, 
such as Red Tractor Assurance or the Lion Code of Practice, the CB will do both 
inspections together whenever possible and the charge from the EA is reduced 
by £910. The CB then have to submit an inspection report to the EA.  
(c) Co-regulation 
Government sets the top-level regulatory requirements and leaves the sector to 
define how these general principles are met in terms of technical solutions. For 
example, in the case of broadcast advertising standards the Office of 
Communications effectively delegates regulation to the Advertising Standards 
Authority, a self-regulatory body, but retains a legislative backstop power.  
The existing system of regulation used in the higher education sector currently 
uses a co-regulatory approach involving the Higher Education Funding Council 
in England, subcontracting its quality assurance activities to the Quality 
Assurance Agency for Higher Education which has substantial sector 
involvement in its assessment framework and inspection activity. Whilst not 
formally co-regulation the inspection activities of Ofsted and CQC in relation to 
schools and hospitals make substantial use of serving teachers and medical staff 
to work on inspections. 
(d) Primary Authority 
A recent initiative, which develops greater regulated self-assurance (although its 
remit is considerably broader) is the Government’s Primary Authority scheme. 
This offers businesses the opportunity to form legally recognised partnerships 
with a single local authority and hence may lead to ‘meta-regulation’ (Baldwin, 
Cave and Lodge, 2012) - the delegation of some of the risk control function to 
individual businesses or groups of businesses.  
For example, a large retailer such as Tesco might have its food safety systems 
‘approved’ by a single local authority and then that local authority can be 
responsible for the schedule of sample inspections. Changes to the scheme 
through the Enterprise Bill, which received Royal Assent on 4 May 2016, enhance 
the role of national regulators, enabling them to support local authorities who are 
primary authorities to develop and issue advice, guidance and inspection plans 
to businesses. The advantage to businesses is consistency of advice, which in 
turn results in savings in time and money. 
This trend towards greater regulated self-assurance is also starting to be 
considered internationally. An example of where a government/industry structure 
has been introduced with a high-level regulator and accredited verifiers is meat 
inspection in New Zealand. The regulatory model has successfully moved from 
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end product inspection (with the onus on government to prove non-compliance) 
to industry-demonstrated compliance.12  
Advantages of regulated self-assurance 
6.7. The advantages of this approach rest on considerations of expertise and efficiency: 
 putting the challenge of designing an effective compliance regime substantially in the 
hands of the businesses being regulated, with higher levels of relevant expertise and 
technical knowledge than is possible with independent regulation, can result in a 
more efficient and better targeted regime;  
 efficiency (for the public purse and the customer) - an organisation can be inspected 
once rather than many times, and there is a reduced requirement on government to 
inspect. It promotes co-ordination, intelligence-sharing and better-targeted 
regulation; 
 critical mass - it may be impracticable to get specialist nationwide coverage of a niche 
sector; delivery is much easier if regulation is added to the remit of say, independent 
certification houses; 
 economies of scope - an independent assurance body may be able to combine 
inspections/assurance activities in a way that government regulators have found it 
difficult to do; and 
 customer choice - as long as regulatory standards are maintained (which in turn 
requires an appropriate level of separation and independence regarding inspection), 
choice between certification houses can drive up efficiency and customer service. 
Disadvantages of regulated self-assurance 
6.8. The disadvantages cited by regulators and in the literature (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 
2012) are centred primarily on mandates, accountability and the fairness of procedures, 
including: 
 in some cases assurance bodies may be more focused on process and less on 
outcomes compared to regulators;  
 industry led standards can place a lot of power with big players. This risk can 
be reduced if the bodies setting the standards have a balance of interests involving 
producers, consumers and independent technical experts, as happens, for example, 
with the Red Tractor scheme; 
                                               
12  Ministry of Primary Industries, New Zealand – presentation to FSA (Hathaway, 2016). 
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 where self-regulation operates as a purely voluntary mechanism, it can leave 
unregulated those organisations which are least inclined to service the public or 
consumer interest. This is why this vision is not advocating a move to pure self-
regulation and why there should still be a government backstop;  
 costs to business arising from compliance with these standards, which are effectively 
mandatory, may be little different from the costs of formal regulation; and 
 although ideally third party certification bodies should be prepared to share data with 
regulators, sometimes this does not happen. If something goes wrong, it is 
government/the regulator who gets criticised so there may be a limit to how far 
responsibilities can be delegated to third parties. 
6.9. A concern raised by some regulators and businesses is that there may be duplication of 
assurance between regulators and assurance bodies, leading to further burdens by 
business on business, referred to as ‘blue tape’ (HSE has begun a project to understand 
and tackle the imposition of such burdens). This is why it is important for regulators to 
consider how far they can work with assurance bodies to achieve their objectives rather 
than to ignore their existence. 
6.10. Perhaps the biggest challenge to regulated self-assurance is whether it can attain public 
confidence and hence political support. For example, the Care Quality Commission 
consulted in late 2015 concerning a move to greater co-regulation with regulated entities 
reporting their own assessment of performance relative to the CQC assessment 
framework. CQC would use this along with their own data to make a risk assessment of 
where further inspection might be required. 
6.11. There was considerable public pushback from those who, among other concerns, had 
insufficient confidence in regulated entities to provide self-assurance, coming so soon 
after the problems exhibited by Mid Staffs Hospital (leading to the Francis Report), 
Morecambe Bay Hospital and Winterbourne View.  
6.12. These concerns are understandable and highlight that the applicability of the use of such 
approaches will be in part a function of the maturity of regulation in the sector and the 
particular challenges which the sector faces. 
6.13. The CQC is now planning to work with the sector so that they can develop a shared view 
of quality. This will then lead to both regulator and regulated using common measures of 
quality and over time may enable the development of greater sharing of data between 
regulated and regulator. Over time as confidence increases in the efficacy of such a 
system this could enable greater ‘earned recognition’, which is the term we use for this 
concept in the case of publicly funded services. In these cases if any alternative forms of 
assurance schemes were to be brought forward the threshold for approval would need to 
be very high in order to command the confidence of the public, service users and 
Ministers. 
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6.14. Government cannot and should not force self-regulation upon companies or sectors but 
we consider that there are several steps which could help to facilitate it: 
 a broad acceptance by government and regulators that this should be the direction 
of travel (which many have already done) and a willingness to engage with this and 
facilitate it. We recommend that all regulators and their sponsor departments should 
respond as to how they plan to move towards such an approach and any reasons 
why they consider that it is not advisable at this stage; 
 government should consider instituting a ‘right to challenge’. This is an initiative which 
has been established in the Netherlands whereby an individual company or sector 
can propose how it should prove compliance with government regulations, with an 
obligation on the regulator to consider the proposal; and 
 more actively, the government or individual regulators could run a challenge 
competition inviting sectors to propose how they might provide their own assurance 
model within the broad framework of ‘regulated self-assurance’. 
6.15. A move to greater regulated self-assurance may however be impeded by the fact that 
assurance schemes or greater self-regulation may incur cost whereas currently regulated 
entities in some cases do not have to pay for the costs of regulation. We turn to this issue 
in Section 7 on charging. 
Where might greater use of regulated self-assurance and earned 
recognition be adopted? 
6.16. In the course of our discussions with regulators it is clear that many either currently use 
this approach or are already actively considering it and in some cases doing detailed 
feasibility work/pilot studies. In this section we give a flavour for some of the areas where 
greater use of self-assurance might be considered.  
6.17. This is neither an exhaustive list, nor a definitive recommendation that such an approach 
should be adopted in the area concerned, as this will need to be considered in detail and 
the costs and benefits examined.  
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Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
Hospitals 
The Commission consulted in 2015/16 on a system of co-regulation for all health and social care providers 
which would have involved hospitals doing more self-assessment. The proposals did not proceed, given 
continuing concern about the maturity of regulation in the sector post the Mid Staffs and Morecambe Bay 
Hospital problems. We understand these concerns and consider that the CQC amended proposals to work 
towards a shared view of quality within the sector are a sensible way forward. 
We consider that in the medium to long term, as regulation of the sector becomes more mature, the sector 
could move further in the direction of self-assurance and earned recognition. In the meantime the frequency 
of inspection will become much more risk-based so there will inevitably be the development of greater earned 
recognition and self-assurance. 
Care homes 
A recent Cutting Red Tape team review of the social care sector highlighted that care homes are currently 
subject to multiple inspections by the CQC as regulator, local authorities as purchasers of residential care, 
and Clinical Commissioning Groups in some cases as purchasers of health care. In such cases a more logical 
approach to inspection might be for the CQC alone to do assurance with respect to social and health care 
and the purchasers to rely on that assessment. We recognise that this would not naturally be seen as 
regulated self-assurance but it would lead to a consolidation of assurance activities. Alternatively, a scheme 
along the lines of Red Tractor in the farm sector might be set up, owned jointly by the care home sector, local 
authorities and Clinical Commissioning Groups which provide assurance regarding the quality of the care 
home which the CQC would then factor into their risk assessment of the care home. 
Dentist practices 
One option would be for regulation of dentist practices to be carried out through the General Dental Council. 
Greater co-ordination is already taking place through the joint dental programme board. In addition, or 
alternatively, with the increasing development of chains of dental practices, regulation could be focused more 
on the corporate entity and make use of their quality and safety systems and reporting, rather than regulating 
the individual practices. 
GP practices 
Currently Clinical Commissioning Groups commission from GP practices on behalf of NHS England, the CQC 
inspects and regulates the GP practice itself, the General Medical Council regulates the individual GPs and 
the Nursing and Midwifery Council the nurses on-site. It was considered by a number of those interviewed 
that whilst coordination and intelligence sharing have improved in recent years there is still potential for there 
to be a clearer delineation of roles and responsibilities to ensure both that each entity’s responsibilities were 
clear and that there was no duplication. This could develop through greater Clinical Commissioning Groups’ 
oversight of GP practices within their areas and/or self-assessment, and CQC assessing more at a corporate 
level through chains of GP practices (which are becoming more prevalent) alongside greater co-ordination 
with the professional regulators. Building on the success of the dental programme board CQC and the 
General Medical Council have recently established a GP regulation programme board. 
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Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) 
The merger of the Driver Standards Agency and the Vehicle and Operator Standards Agency to form the 
Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) has led the agency to consider afresh how it carries out 
vehicle and driver regulation, within the context of the Motoring Services Strategy. 
Possible areas where greater regulated self-assurance might be adopted include: 
 greater earned autonomy and self-assurance for large vehicle (both heavy goods vehicles and public 
service vehicles) fleet operators in areas such as vehicle testing and operator compliance including 
driver qualifications and driver hour monitoring. Excellent operators who joined the scheme would 
submit data reports to the DVSA so adherence to regulations could be monitored. This could lead to 
reduced roadside compliance checks from operators who are members of the scheme as well as 
potentially (subject to legislative change) the removal of the need for an annual vehicle test as the 
vehicle would be subject to more frequent vehicle monitoring; 
 for medium and small size operators there may be scope for more vehicle testing to be carried out 
by approved testing companies (which might be those who have benefited from earned autonomy 
as discussed above) or even perhaps the development of sector assurance schemes working with 
existing industry associations; and 
 for driving instructors there may be scope for greater earned autonomy via instructor companies 
(already motorcycle training assurance is via entities rather than individuals) and/or through sector 
bodies such as Approved Driving Instructor national associations. 
There are currently 2,200 driving examiners employed by DVSA (though DVSA themselves do not 
categorise this as a regulatory activity). There is already a system of delegated examiners for MoD, police, 
fire, bus and some large transport companies. This might be expanded initially to include those operators 
who are part of the earned autonomy scheme. 
 
Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate (EAS) 
EAS have traditionally carried out reactive investigations, although they are rapidly moving to a system 
of proactive investigations to complement their inbound complaints system. EAS in general carry out 
reactive and proactive risk based investigations. Hence whilst a move to greater self-assessment might 
not lead to any significant reduction in cost for EAS, there could be an increase in effectiveness if there 
were to be the development of an industry International Organisation for Standardization standard or an 
EAS voluntary Kitemark scheme (paid for by the sector). 
 
Environment Agency 
The Environment Agency already makes use of self-assurance. For example, in the case of the Pig and 
Poultry Assurance Scheme the inspection task can be delegated to Red Tractor scheme assurers. Such 
approaches could be considered further, either in terms of delegation of tasks or membership of a scheme 
(e.g. the National Quality Mark scheme for land contamination) being factored into risk assessment. 
Similarly, as environmental management systems improve and are used more widely there may be scope 
for a greater degree of self-assurance. 
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Food Standards Agency (FSA) 
Currently the FSA directly employs meat hygiene inspectors in abattoirs and in poultry plants. This costs 
approximately £60 million each year, around half of the FSA’s total expenditure. There is scope to move 
towards greater self-testing and assurance, as is already possible for poultry plants and in egg testing, 
with reports made to the FSA and sample checks. There are currently some difficulties in moving to such 
a system under European regulations which the UK may no longer have to comply with post Brexit 
(depending on the terms of leaving the EU). 
Under its proposed regulatory strategy the FSA is considering having direct strategic relationships with 
the largest 15 to 20 companies involved in food retailing, manufacturing and restaurants. A self-assurance 
mechanism could work in these cases where the company agrees what quality assurance system they 
should use with the FSA (or primary authority). There would then be sample audit checks to ensure that 
the quality assurance system is being used as intended alongside reporting of incidents to the FSA and 
potentially the FSA having full access to the QA reports. 
For medium-sized companies there could be greater use of sector assurance schemes to inform the risk 
assessments by the FSA and local authorities. We have described elsewhere in the report how this works 
for farm inspections through the Red Tractor scheme. Currently the FSA is trialling with the British Retail 
Consortium (BRC) Global Standards whether a similar approach could also be used in relation to food 
manufacturing. For food retailers such a scheme could be operated through BRC Global Standards. 
Currently there is no such scheme for catering establishments but we understand that there is early-stage 
consideration of such a scheme. In the medium to long term, once confidence has been established, 
there might be full delegation of task to such sector assurance schemes. 
Evaluation reports indicate that the food hygiene ratings used by the FSA in England and Wales have 
had considerable success in improving food hygiene. In order to ensure that such ratings have continuing 
currency and hence maintain the integrity of the scheme, the FSA should continue its exploration with the 
sector how external assurance/certification bodies might play a part in the future in the scheme. 
 
Gambling Commission 
Currently there is licensing of businesses, premises (by local authorities), personal management licences 
and personal functional licences. The Commission considers that there may be scope to reduce some of 
the personal functional licences (e.g. of croupiers in casinos), particularly where there is an operator with 
a good track record in meeting the Gambling Commission’s licensing objectives. 
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Ofsted 
Schools and further education colleges 
There is already self-assurance by independent schools where, if they have been ranked ‘good’ or 
‘outstanding’, they become eligible to apply for membership to a recognised association. Once accepted 
they can be inspected by the relevant inspectorate for their association. With the growth and intended 
further expansion of publicly funded multi-academy chains there is the potential for the regulator to assess 
quality assurance systems at a chain level and then for there to be greater self- assurance of individual 
schools by the academy chain itself. 
Similarly, with the development of some very large multi-site further education colleges there may be the 
potential to develop a similar self-assessment approach for regulation as for academy chains. 
Early years providers 
There are many nursery schools which are part of larger businesses are spread across multiple sites and 
hence a similar approach to assurance could be used for them as for academy chains. In the case of 
childminders, assurance could be carried out through sector associations, childminding agencies, or even 
potentially in connection with local schools (which would strengthen the relationship between schools and 
local childminders although adding a significant new role to schools). 
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7. Cost recovery 
7.1. There is considerable variation between regulators in the extent to which they recover 
costs through charging the regulated for regulatory activities. Figure 5 shows the 
breakdown of regulatory costs between whether they are covered by government grant-
in-aid or by charges, for those regulators for which we obtained data. Figure 6 shows the 
variation between regulators as to the percentage of the regulatory budget which is 
covered by fees. 
Figure 5: Funding split by source 
 
Sources: Regulatory Futures Data Collection, PB2015, desk research 
Notes: Regulatory spend comprises 45 bodies of the 71 bodies identified as having some regulatory 
role and local authority spend for regulation (excluding housing, pest control, public conveniences 
and licensing). Data not readily available for RPA or EFA. 
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Figure 6: Regulatory budget and cost recovery 
 
Sources: Regulatory Futures Data Collection, PB2015, desk research 
Notes: Data largely relates to the 2015 to 2016 financial period and therefore may not reflect the latest position
Key 
Green group (high % recovery through fees) 
(Light green) - Small-scale, total % recovery 
through fees 
(Dark green dash) - Medium-scale, high % 
recovery through fees 
Red group - Variable scale, c. half recovery 
through fees 
Blue group (low % / zero recovery through 
fees) 
(Light blue) - Small-scale, some recovery 
through fees  
(Dark blue dash) - Small-scale, no recovery 
through fees 
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7.2. In some cases one can see a rationale why some regulators’ costs might be borne by 
government grant-in-aid (e.g. the costs of Ofsted inspection of schools where the 
alternative would be government increasing the grant to individual schools and then 
levying a charge on schools).  
7.3. However in many cases it is a product of history where the regulatory model and 
legislation vary, rather than logic. Examples include: 
 the MHRA, where costs of regulating medicines are fully charged for, whereas the 
costs of regulating medical devices are primarily funded through a service level 
agreement with the Department of Health;  
 Ofqual, where, although most qualifications are from private-sector providers, the 
costs are fully-borne by the Exchequer and the regulator has no legal power to levy 
charges for regulation; and 
 the Care Quality Commission which is moving towards full-cost recovery for its 
regulatory services even where they are of publicly-funded entities, whereas Ofsted 
currently does not recover inspection costs from publicly-funded schools but it is 
moving towards full-cost recovery in other areas of its remit. 
7.4. A number of regulators, in addition to CQC, have already decided to move in the direction 
of full-cost recovery or are consulting on doing so, for example the Charity Commission. 
Other regulators informed us that they would ideally like to charge but when they had 
considered doing so in the past encountered very strong push-back either from 
stakeholders or from within government. 
7.5. In our view a default presumption of full-cost recovery for regulatory activities is a 
necessary condition in those areas where a move towards regulated self-assurance is 
feasible. Otherwise there will not be a level playing field between direct regulators’ 
assurance and the use of self-assurance and third-party assurance.  
7.6. For example, the Food Standards Agency allows poultry plants to carry out their own 
testing of meat hygiene through employing their own poultry inspection assistants rather 
than FSA employed Meat Hygiene Inspectors. However, there has been very little take-
up. This is not surprising as the plant concerned will bear the full cost of the poultry 
inspection assistant whereas approximately half the cost of the FSA’s Meat Hygiene 
Inspector is recovered through the charge to the poultry plant.  
7.7. Similarly while the Red Tractor Assurance Scheme charges for membership, farms do 
not currently incur a direct charge for inspection by local authorities on behalf of the 
Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra) or the FSA. As a result there 
is not a level playing field between regulator direct assurance and self-assurance. 
7.8. As either company self-assurance or assurance by a third party certification body is likely 
in most cases to be voluntary it would be necessary for the fee for regulatory services to 
be reduced if there were self-assurance by the company. An example of how this might 
work is provided by the Environment Agency’s Pig and Poultry Assurance Scheme where 
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the task of inspection can be delegated to a Red Tractor inspector. In such cases there 
is a discount on the fee to the Environment Agency from £2,490 to £1,580. 
7.9. A particular issue in relation to full-cost recovery is the extent to which enforcement costs 
can be recovered through licence fees. For example, in waste permitting the Environment 
Agency’s costs associated with enforcement are covered through grant in aid rather than 
through subsistence charges.  
7.10. With current constraints on government spending there have been reductions in the 
grant-in-aid for enforcement activity. In the recent Cutting Red Tape team review of 
waste, the industry feedback was reported to be that they would be prepared to bear the 
cost of a proper level of enforcement in their licence fees as this would help to ensure 
that those ‘doing the right thing’ by adhering to good practice were not at a competitive 
disadvantage. 
7.11. We understand that the reason for this stance regarding enforcement costs is that use of 
the ‘standard model’ (Section 6 of ‘Managing public money’) would not permit recovering 
costs of enforcement from licence fee holders as they are not causing the costs to be 
incurred and will not be benefiting from the enforcement. However, in our view, other 
companies in the relevant sectors do benefit from a properly-resourced enforcement 
system ensuring a level playing field. 
7.12. Section 6 of ‘Managing Public Money’ does enable the use of ‘non-standard models’ 
(which could enable the recovery of enforcement costs) subject to approval by 
HM Treasury. Furthermore there are examples of regulators, such as the DVSA (for some 
of their activities), who are able to recover enforcement costs.  
7.13. We recommend therefore that HM Treasury consider adopting a presumption that 
regulators can recover the costs of enforcement actions through the licence fee or other 
charges which they consider to be appropriate, when considering such proposals under 
the non-standard model. 
7.14. Currently, fines levied by regulators are paid into the Consolidated Fund. In some cases 
these can be substantial, for example £37 million in fines in 2015/16 in the case of the 
Health and Safety Executive. We understand why this is the case as it would not be 
desirable for regulators to take action motivated by a desire to generate revenue from 
fines. However, if the recommendation in section 7.13 were not considered acceptable 
an alternative might be to take some account of revenue from fines in determining what 
grant-in-aid might be appropriate for enforcement action. 
7.15. There are other aspects of HM Treasury rules which can also cause issues for regulators. 
The following are a couple of examples: 
 the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) undertake audits of data protection 
processes at organisations (either because of a serious breach or because they are 
invited by that organisation). This is currently not charged for, but if it were then the 
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money raised would go into the Consolidated Fund. It is therefore not considered to 
be an organisational priority, as it would be of no benefit to the ICO;  
 there are other more technical issues concerning the setting of fee levels, the extent 
to which an agency is permitted to run a surplus, and the consequences of annuality 
which are frustrations for regulators, but we recognise that these are broader issues 
affecting many parts of the public sector rather than being specific to regulators. 
7.16. Other benefits from a move to a presumption of full-cost recovery would include:  
 a benefit to the Exchequer which we estimate in Section 12 to be in excess of £500 
million per annum; and 
 increased accountability of regulators due to the need to consult on fees and charges. 
7.17. Whilst we consider that there should be a default presumption of full-cost recovery for 
regulatory activities where a move to regulated self-assurance is feasible, we recognise 
that it may not be possible or desirable in all cases. Reasons why it may be judged not 
to be appropriate include: 
 that it would be undesirable to charge for provision of information and awareness-
raising to encourage compliance. For example, the HSE has developed a number of 
Safety Health and Awareness Days over many years. These are free events, 
dedicated to raising awareness and understanding of important health and safety 
issues specific to a particular industry. However in many circumstances it is and will 
be appropriate to charge for advice;  
 when the costs of administration and recovery would exceed the cost. While this may 
apply currently in some cases where there are paper-based systems (e.g. Forestry 
Commission felling licences), as regulators move to online-based application and 
payment systems, charging should become more practical; and 
 when charging would just involve cost-shifting within the public sector. For example 
if Ofsted were to charge for its regulation of schools. However even here there could 
be a case for doing so as Ofsted currently charges in some sectors and not in others, 
even when they serve children of the same ages (e.g. regulation of private schools 
vs state schools or state nursery schools vs private nurseries/childminders) and this 
could be seen as leading to an uneven playing field. Or it may be to ensure 
appropriate incentives are in place to achieve regulatory outcomes, for example 
Ofqual charging for qualifications to remain registered to avoid the situation of having 
many non-active qualifications on their registration database. 
The structure of charges 
7.18. A second issue concerning charging is the principles which should be used to structure 
charges for regulated services. In particular how charges can be used to provide the right 
incentives to drive achievement of key regulatory objectives.  
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7.19. There are, sometimes countervailing, pressures which need to be taken into account: 
 the wish to encourage compliance and high performance through provision of advice 
and education in preference to an approach of inspection and enforcement;  
 the desire to encourage self-reporting of incidents to the regulator and hence a ‘no 
blame’ culture; and  
 a desire to incentivise regulated entities to be compliant and hence for those who are 
not compliant and/or who impose the greatest costs on the regulators to bear those 
costs themselves. 
7.20. The third of these approaches has gained increased traction with regulators over the past 
few years. Different variants of the principle of charges being determined by the cost 
placed on the regulator are illustrated by the case studies of the approaches used by the 
Environment Agency, the Health and Safety Executive and the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate. 
Case study: Environment Agency 
The Environmental Agency’s risk-based approach is reflected in their charging scheme: applications 
which take more resource to determine attract a higher charge than those which can be dealt with simply. 
Similarly, they undertake more compliance assessment and inspection work on activities and sites which 
pose the greatest risk, and this differential is also reflected in charges. 
In parts of the Environmental Permitting Regulations they therefore apply a multiplier to their annual fees, 
ranging from x0.95 for the best performing to x3.0 for the worst performing. 
 
Case study: Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
HSE introduced a Fee for Intervention where they would charge a company in material breach of health 
and safety regulations for the initial inspection and investigation required to identify the breach and any 
inspection and advice required in order to remedy the breach. 
 
Case study: Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) 
The DWI charges water companies a basic fee determined by the number of customers they serve. Water 
companies are legally obliged to report incidents where there are breaches in drinking water regulations 
which the DWI then investigates and reports on. The DWI charges a supplement to companies dependent 
on the costs which they impose on the DWI for subsequent investigation. 
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7.21. Such approaches could be extended more widely. We set out below some illustrative 
examples of areas where such an approach might be considered. These are not specific 
recommendations as the regulators concerned would need to consider carefully the costs 
and benefits (including potential changes to legislation): 
 a food retailing establishment which has a very low food hygiene rating requiring 
more frequent inspection could bear the additional cost of more frequent inspection 
(this would of course require there to be the ability to charge for food hygiene 
regulation in the first place);  
 a care home which requires more frequent inspection based on a risk-based 
approach to inspection;  
 early years providers or childminders who require more frequent inspection due to a 
low rating; and  
 charging driving instructors more for subsequent standards checks within a 
registration period. 
7.22. Such approaches also need to be considered alongside whether an establishment should 
be able to request re-inspection if they wish to see whether their rating should improve. 
Whilst in most cases the rating itself is not the primary objective of the inspection, the fact 
that it is then published could significantly affect the entity concerned. In such cases 
should there be a right to request a re-inspection within a specified period, with an 
associated charge for this re-inspection? 
7.23. In the case of publicly-funded services such as schools, it is understandable why re-
inspection (and an associated charge) is not permitted. However in the case of a food 
retailer or childminder there is a stronger case for permitting such re-inspection (with an 
associated charge) particularly where display of the rating is mandatory (in Wales where 
display of food hygiene ratings is mandatory the retailer can request re-inspection). 
However where an entity receives a very low score the entity is likely to be re-inspected 
quickly in any case (usually within six months) so this may allay some of the concerns 
about not permitting re-inspection. 
7.24. Cost-reflective charging may not be appropriate if it serves to discourage an open and 
honest relationship between the regulated and the regulator. Our proposal to encourage 
greater regulated self-assessment is designed both to encourage greater self-
assessment and open reporting of incidents by the regulated to the regulator in a ‘no 
blame’ culture.  
7.25. If a consequence of introducing charging for the burden placed on the regulator were to 
discourage such reporting, the costs could well outweigh the benefits, for example this 
may be a risk in care where past failures have been linked to closed cultures that 
discourage open reporting. Clearly the Drinking Water Inspectorate and the Health and 
Safety Executive have judged, perhaps because of the legal reporting responsibilities on 
regulated entities, that the benefits of such an approach outweighed the costs. Others 
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such as the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency have taken a 
different view and currently judge that such charges could discourage reporting.  
Ensuring that the regulator is efficient 
7.26. One of the concerns that the regulated would understandably have with a proposal for 
full-cost recovery for charging is whether this would diminish the pressure on the regulator 
to be efficient. While regulators are at least part-funded by the Exchequer this might be 
seen as less of a direct concern for the regulated, due to spending constraints. We 
consider that there are 2 mechanisms whereby with charging, pressure on the regulator 
to be efficient could in fact increase rather than decrease. 
7.27. Firstly, the increased ability to self-assure, or use one of a number of competing 
certification bodies to assure (as occurs with the Red Tractor scheme), will mean that 
there will be a competitive pressure on some of the regulators costs in a way that there 
has not been in the past (as long as there is a move towards greater cost reflectivity 
in charging). 
7.28. Secondly, the need for the regulator to consult on fees and charges will also provide a 
mechanism for the regulated to exert influence on the charge levied. 
Recommendations 
7.29. We recommend that a default presumption of full cost recovery (including enforcement 
costs) should be adopted by regulators for regulated activities where regulated self-
assurance is feasible. This would facilitate an approach to regulation which emphasises 
the need for the regulated to ensure compliance and for the regulator to make use of 
other mechanisms (e.g. purchasers) to encourage compliance and improvement.  
7.30. While there will be instances where the presumption of full cost recovery will not make 
sense it should be the responsibility of the regulator concerned to make the case why it 
is not appropriate to have full-cost recovery for all their activities.  
7.31. We recognise that such a presumption will in some cases require legislative change 
and/or a greater willingness to adopt a non-standard charging model in line with HM 
Treasury guidance on ‘Managing Public Money’. 
7.32. We further recommend that all regulators look at the structure of their charges as to 
whether there should be greater differentiation of charges to reflect the burden which 
regulators place upon the regulated. 
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8. Intelligence and data sharing 
Introduction 
8.1. An important feature of the Review has been a desire from regulators for increased co-
operation and collaboration.  
8.2. When the Review held its introductory workshop on objectives, there was a strong view 
that a specific area the Review should consider was how inspection activity could be more 
targeted via information and intelligence sharing. This is also one of the major principles 
set out in the Regulators’ Code. 
8.3. It was also considered that there was an additional distinct opportunity for greater data 
sharing so that regulated entities do not have to provide the same information more than 
once. At its simplest level the opportunity around data/information sharing can be defined 
as the ‘Tell us once’ principle being applied to the relationship between the regulated and 
regulators. This was explored through an information sharing work-stream.  
8.4. The distinction between information and intelligence sharing is relatively permeable and 
is a function of the nature of information which can be considered to exist on a spectrum: 
that which is (relatively) static, objective and clerical in nature through to that which may 
contain additional qualities that allow the user to draw out conclusions pertaining to risk. 
8.5. A significant part of our investigation work looked at the scope for greater intelligence and 
data sharing. Health and Safety Executive led the intelligence sharing stream of work and 
this section of the main report draws heavily on their work.  
The potential benefits of intelligence and information sharing  
8.6. In 2014, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) launched a consultation 
on data sharing for non-economic regulators. The initial consultation noted that: 
“Businesses have told us that data collection remains a significant burden for them. 
Regulators have told us that data sharing is the biggest challenge they face in meeting 
the provisions of the new Regulators’ Code.” 
8.7. The government’s response to the consultation, released in 2015, concluded that 
“significant benefits can result from regulatory data sharing, both in terms of enabling 
regulators to fulfil their statutory functions more efficiently and effectively, and in reducing 
burden and delivering earned recognition for compliant businesses”.  
8.8. This message is consistent with the views of regulators in the course of our investigations 
who saw the expected benefits of greater data and intelligence sharing as: 
 better understanding of the business landscape. If regulators had access to 
intelligence across sectors there would be an opportunity to identify and understand 
Regulatory Futures Review: Intelligence and data sharing | 53 
 
 
emerging risks and trends. It may be the case that greater sharing of intelligence of 
simple things such as rogue landlords, banned food providers or banned business 
owners would provide insight into how certain risks are displaced into different 
localities or business sectors; 
 fewer wasted resources. Through the sharing of both intelligence and 
administrative data there would be less waste of resources. In some instances 
regulators have out of date information which can lead to visits to sites that are either 
an exemplar of good practice, have diversified or closed; 
 improved speed in the identification of risk. In some instances sites that are high 
risk may not be visible to the regulator either because they are in what is determined 
as a low risk sector or the business is not known to the regulator. A benefit of 
intelligence sharing would be that businesses which are currently slower to be 
identified as high risk could be identified through intelligence from other government 
regulators reducing the risk to the public through more efficient and effective targeted 
intervention; 
 a level playing field for business. If intelligence sharing were implemented 
effectively there would be a greater focus on poor performers whilst having more 
appropriate interactions with compliant businesses. This would mean that sites that 
may cut corners in order to achieve a competitive advantage will be under greater 
scrutiny from regulators; 
 earned recognition. If data containing performance indicators was shared efficiently 
there would be the ability to identify sites and companies that require less government 
intervention. This may mean that a company that has had a number of compliant 
inspections across different departments may warrant earned autonomy for a certain 
duration; and 
 joint working. If a company is consistently non-compliant the regulators could work 
collaboratively to try to ensure that sustainable measures are put in place across 
multiple areas of regulation to safeguard the public and employees. 
8.9. From the BIS consultation, it was clear that the full benefits of data sharing had not been 
realised, and this finding is also clear from the investigation work in this review. When 
asked what was preventing regulators from sharing data, the responses cited a number 
of reasons, including: 
 a need (whether real or perceived) to have data sharing agreements or memoranda 
of understanding in place before data can be shared means that establishing data 
sharing practices can be time consuming and resource intensive; 
 cleansing data received from other regulators can be resource intensive and can 
increase burden. There needs to be an appropriate balance between this burden and 
the benefits resulting from data sharing; 
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 the Data Protection Act (DPA) is commonly cited as a reason why data cannot be 
shared. There is confusion as to the exemptions under the DPA and when these 
apply. This confusion is often perceived by regulators as either genuine 
misunderstanding or an excuse not to share data; 
 some regulators are restricted by their enabling statutes, which limit the type of data 
they can share and who it can be shared with; 
 cultural barriers can prevent or discourage data sharing. Some regulators do not 
consider data sharing to be useful in meeting their own priorities and therefore 
consider data sharing to be a low priority; and 
 a reluctance to ‘trust’ that data will be safeguarded appropriately once it has been 
given to another regulator. 
8.10. Despite these barriers, many regulators have managed to find solutions which are 
delivering benefits. In line with the findings of this Review, the consultation noted that 
many regulators are using data sharing agreements and memoranda of understanding to 
facilitate data sharing. Most respondents indicated that they share data on request, with 
some noting the use of shared databases or compatible systems. However, regulators 
saw there being considerable, as yet untapped, potential. 
Case study: Intelligent Regulatory Information System 
This was a pilot project led by the Better Regulation Delivery Office (BRDO), which commissioned the 
Health and Safety Executive to develop an extended version of a tool called ‘Find it’ that the HSE had 
developed previously. The ‘Find it’ tool helped HSE transform the effectiveness of its inspection activities 
by helping identify businesses and premises that are likely to be high risk in terms of their likelihood to be 
in breach of health and safety legislation. 
The pilot involved four regulators (three local authorities and a fire and rescue service) in the 
Leicestershire area sharing data using the Intelligent Regulatory Information System (IRIS). Data from 
the four regulators, plus data from other sources, was imported into IRIS so that all the regulators could 
access it. Findings from the evaluation of the pilot indicates that IRIS helped regulators locate previously 
unknown premises and take a proactive approach to providing businesses with advice on compliance 
issues and enhance public protection. 
 
8.11. Whilst the IRIS pilot showed some potential benefits there was difficulty in quantifying 
these benefits and hence in presenting a convincing business case for taking this forward. 
Beyond such examples of work led by the BRDO, we are aware of a number of other 
initiatives that are ongoing in the area of data and intelligence sharing. 
Potential intelligence sharing pathfinder projects 
8.12. In this review we sought to identify potential pathfinder projects which would help in 
making the business case for the investment needed in greater intelligence sharing. 
Whilst progress has been made and there is a high degree of interest and enthusiasm 
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amongst regulators it has not been possible to carry out full-scale feasibility studies during 
this review. This work is therefore ongoing and HSE in their report identify four potential 
pathfinder projects. We summarise the two most developed of these below. 
 Farming Regulation, Defra. There are several agencies and public bodies which 
provide oversight of farming activity within Defra. A pathfinder project in this area 
would look into how, using data science techniques and a range of key Defra 
datasets, sharing data for improving risk-based inspection across Defra can yield 
benefits. Anecdotal information suggests that in some areas of inspection a 
significant proportion of visits do not find the farming activity expected and hence the 
visit is nugatory. It is proposed that the study would use a predictive analytic process 
to demonstrate the practical application and benefit of sharing data to improve 
inspection targeting beyond the current regimes. The larger farm inspections project 
of which this would form a part has estimated that cost savings of the order of £6 
million over a five year period might be attained. The savings from this pathfinder 
project would therefore be somewhat less.  
 Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate. A system for data and intelligence 
sharing between the Employment Agency Standards (EAS) part of BEIS and other 
bodies involved in labour market enforcement is being explored. Discussions have 
started on how the Health and Safety Executive ‘Find it’ approach and tools can add 
to this. An immediate requirement identified is to examine and link a number of EAS 
datasets to provide greater insight. It is estimated that this could yield savings for the 
Inspectorate of £50,000 per annum. 
8.13. While there has been work with individual departments and regulators on the pathfinder 
projects, there was also a view that there needed to be greater central coordination. This 
ranged from storing and maintaining data catalogues and centrally-procured intelligence 
through to best practice and intelligence sharing research. The idea of a Regulatory 
Intelligence Hub, with a combined, cross-department, role for government, was seen as 
being a priority for a large number of the regulators.  
8.14. Outline estimates suggest that savings in the order of £7.5 million per annum are 
achievable from such a concept assuming that a group of 30 regulators spending on 
average £1 million on intelligence can make savings of 25% in line with previous pilots.  
8.15. We consider that this has potential but in our view the focus in the short term should be 
on the pathfinder projects to prove the value of intelligence sharing, while a working group 
should be established to consider further the scope and feasibility of an intelligence hub. 
Output of the information sharing work-stream 
8.16. This work-stream involved a data collection questionnaire (DCQ) which was sent to 
regulators in advance of a workshop. The responses to the DCQ, provide a high-level 
overview of the type of information collected and shared within the regulatory sector and 
can now be used as a starting point to drill down into these data sets to understand further 
the cross-sector value of the information collected. There was appetite to hold more 
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focused discussions with regulatory partners who share common regulatory objectives or 
where there is a clear overlap in regulatory duties.  
8.17. The need for a set of clear and robust data-sharing principles was often cited by those 
regulators who participated. The existence of a standardised approach to maintaining 
datasets will help foster confidence in the data held by ‘other regulators’ and facilitate 
collaborative working. The Register Design Authority has published a number of blogs on 
the topic of information governance and canonical datasets which should assist 
regulators. 
8.18. The discussions during the workshop indicated a preference for a more targeted 
approach to sharing data where application programming interfaces (APIs) facilitate 
access to information of specific interest. APIs provide a set of routines, protocols and 
tools for interaction between two different software. For example, this allows one 
regulator’s software to interrogate another regulator’s data as opposed to a transfer of 
the entire dataset. Aside from the legal and technical complications, this approach would 
place unrealistic expectations on ‘data rich’ bodies responsible for maintaining sizeable 
and complex data sets. A federated model, in which specific datasets are held by 
individual regulators, was considered favourable to pooling information into a single data 
repository or opening up entire data catalogues to third parties. 
8.19. Generic data sets were considered to hold the most identifiable ‘cross-sector’ value. The 
Office for National Statistics, Companies House and HMRC were often cited as the most 
authoritative sources of generic datasets (e.g. company turnover, number of staff). The 
Business Index beta, expected to be launched later this year, may provide a useful 
opportunity for regulators to reference their own data sets against that held in the index. 
8.20. The feedback during this work-stream suggested that the sharing of intelligence appears 
to deliver more tangible outcomes for regulators than a narrower focus on data. The 
intelligence sharing work-stream highlighted the value of a Regulatory Intelligence Hub; 
many of the matters raised in the information sharing work-stream could also be explored 
through such a hub. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
8.21. We recommend that interested regulators work together to give further consideration to 
the feasibility of establishing a Regulatory Intelligence Hub. While in our view the focus 
in the short term should be on the pathfinder projects, matters identified such as the need 
for standard data sharing principles suggest that regulators could benefit from creating a 
working group. Such a working group could then also consider further the scope and 
feasibility of an intelligence hub. 
Regulatory Futures Review: Developing expertise within regulators | 57 
 
 
9. Developing expertise within regulators 
The case for greater co-operation, co-ordination and career 
development 
9.1. The initial workshop held in December 2015 and subsequent data collection exercise 
identified that regulators were all facing similar challenges when it came to recruiting and 
retaining staff, and identified a need to improve training and career development.  
9.2. Responses included: 
 “An important factor is ability for staff to build a career in regulation with the ability to 
move between organisations.”; and  
 “A clearer career pathway … would facilitate movement between regulators.” 
9.3. Further evidence which arose during the investigations phase highlighted challenges in 
arranging secondments between regulators even between those that were co-located 
and sponsored by the same department. 
9.4. Regulators also fed back that they valued the Regulatory Futures Review for providing a 
forum for regulators to meet and share experience with others who they might not 
ordinarily encounter in their normal networks. Such benefits are not easily quantified but 
are nonetheless real. Examples of benefits and contacts which we are aware of, arising 
from this review, include: 
 Ofsted learning of a scheduling tool which is used by the CQC for scheduling 
inspection visits which enables substantial self-service by inspectors;  
 CQC discussing with Ofsted approaches to regulation of groups of schools or care 
homes, GP practices etc. rather than just the entity itself, as well as comparing their 
respective roles in improvement and ratings, and reviewing performance of services 
in an area; and  
 regulators expressing interest in the 3-day course run for Ofqual by the Centre for 
Regulation at London School of Economics (LSE). 
9.5. While a small number of networks of regulators exist there have traditionally been limited 
opportunities for all regulators to come together and develop through peer-led learning. 
9.6. Making use of existing talent within the regulatory community and developing 
mechanisms to provide opportunities for this talent within the community would serve a 
dual purpose of not only retaining talent but also allowing it to develop expertise and 
thereby strengthen the institution. 
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Models for greater career development and collaboration between 
regulators enabling greater cross-fertilisation of ideas and 
experience 
9.7. There are several approaches which might be used to address these issues and these 
were tested with regulators during a workshop. The options range from the tactical to the 
strategic. 
9.8. One initiative would involve developing a simple process for sharing staff between 
regulators. While regulators could employ tactical measures such as development of a 
Memorandum of Understanding with those partners with whom there was greatest 
potential, a multi-lateral initiative would clearly be more beneficial. Introducing such 
mechanisms which raise awareness of (secondment) opportunities would then create a 
mini-market for regulatory staff.  
9.9. There are challenges to using existing portals such as Civil Service Jobs for this, as not 
all regulatory staff are classified as civil servants (notably those in non-departmental 
public bodies (with the exception of the Health and Safety Executive) and government 
companies). When advertising jobs the Civil Service Jobs website is restricted to civil 
service posts and posts in bodies that have been accredited by the Civil Service 
Commission. 
9.10. Another initiative could involve having a consistent approach to training and assessing 
the performance of regulatory staff. This would help ensure that if and when staff were 
seconded or moved permanently to other regulators they could perform in line with the 
expectations of the role.  
9.11. Developing a consistent framework that applied to each and every aspect of regulatory 
activity – for instance from those that specialise in risk analysis through to those that 
inspect and enforce - would clearly be the aim but this would not be possible without a 
significant level of effort. While this would take some time to develop, a consistent 
methodology for assessing staff would make it easier for staff to understand how their 
skills could be applied elsewhere. 
9.12. Both of these ideas would clearly take some effort and it may be appropriate to deliver 
smaller-scale initiatives by considering clusters of regulators to get these initiatives 
operational. This could be through existing networks or by creating new networks (e.g. 
using the classification exercise performed within this review to inform membership of 
such networks). 
9.13. A more strategic measure would involve the creation of a strategic Human Resources 
(HR) function. Such a function would take the lead in developing a talent management 
and leadership development strategy rather than focusing on the transactional aspects 
of HR. 
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9.14. An even more strategic solution would be to reimagine the population of regulators as 
being somewhat akin to a profession as with the Government Economic Service or 
Government Statistical Service. The number of staff at regulatory bodies is in excess of 
20,000, although some of these may be members of other professions. This number 
exceeds those within the Government Statistical Service (c. 6,000), Government 
Economic Service (c. 1,900) and the total potential number of people who may form part 
of the nascent Commercial function (4,000). This suggests that there is sufficient scale 
within the regulatory community in principle to justify such an initiative. 
9.15. Within the Civil Service, the words function and profession tend to be used 
interchangeably but are in fact intended to refer to different things. At its simplest, a 
function delivers services through roles, standards and processes whereas a profession 
is a collection of individuals with similar expertise. This means that a function may 
have a profession that links directly to it or it may use a range of professions to deliver 
its services. 
9.16. The Civil Service has outlined the design principles for functions and these are instructive 
for the types of challenge that regulators may face if they pursue this route.13 The 
guidance elaborates on how most functions have converged towards a similar model: 
departmental functional leads have ‘dotted line’ reporting to a central functional leader 
and ‘solid line’ reporting to their overall department or agency head. Such a model can 
also be adopted by professions and is the model adopted for the Government Economic 
Service where there is a dotted line relationship from the Chief Economist in departments 
to the Head of the Government Economic Service. 
9.17. Such a model retains the existing Ministerial and Accounting Officer accountability 
arrangements but provides the central functional lead with the responsibility for their 
overall function. While this approach seems a logical approach for many of the functions 
identified, it is worth noting that many of these functions are in effect corporate services 
that enable government to deliver its policy initiatives, whereas regulators have a more 
active role in policy. In this context, a dotted line approach could be perceived by 
regulators as a challenge to the independence of regulators. 
9.18. Regulators considered there to be value in pursuing common training and greater co-
ordination between regulators to enable better talent management potentially building on 
existing networks to pursue these aims.  
9.19. Regulators on the whole did not feel that there was a strong case currently for a move 
towards a regulatory profession, partly because there was some scepticism as to whether 
there was sufficient commonality between regulators but also because several felt that 
their sectoral or professional expertise was more relevant to the tasks they carried out 
than regulatory expertise. Instead they felt that there is a need to introduce greater 
collaboration initially and assess how that worked before investing in greater integration. 
                                               
13  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/418869/The_ 
Functional_Model.pdf  
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Others also pointed out some staff at regulators are already members of other 
professions (e.g. economists, statisticians, legal). 
Conclusions and recommendations 
9.20. There is in our view sufficient commonality between regulators that there would be merit 
in greater co-ordination between them and sharing of best practice.  
9.21. While there are existing networks of economic and safety regulators, we consider that 
there would be value in a broader network. There is a good case for a small central 
unit (perhaps 2 to 3 full-time equivalent), reporting to a steering group of regulators, 
which would: 
 hold and develop knowledge and expertise around regulation, which is currently 
mostly developed in isolation. A particular focus would be thinking around non-
business regulation;  
 be responsible for organising the development of a series of core training courses for 
regulators; 
 serve as the secretariat for the regulators’ network; 
 co-ordinate action on initiatives such as the Regulatory Intelligence Hub; and 
 possibly provide co-ordination of career development.  
We do not consider that at this stage there is sufficient case for development of a 
regulatory profession, along the lines of, for example, the Government Economic Service 
or Government Finance Profession. 
9.22. Consideration should also be given to whether this central unit might be ‘hosted’ by some 
external body such as the Institute for Government or the Centre for Regulation at the 
LSE - although in such circumstances it would not be appropriate for it to have a role in 
co-ordination of career development. 
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10. Burdens on regulators 
Background to the issue 
10.1. One of the objectives of the review was to ‘identify the sources of burden on regulators 
themselves, the opportunities to reduce those burdens and hence to reduce cost, 
complexity and delays in regulation’. 
10.2. As regulators can both make (in some cases) and enforce rules, the Government has 
sought to introduce mechanisms which seek to ensure that their powers are used properly 
and that an undue burden is not placed upon those who are regulated.  
10.3. As a result a series of duties have been imposed on regulators such as a duty to take 
into account the impact of regulation on growth and (through an obligation on departments) 
to produce innovation plans to ensure that the scope for innovation within regulatory 
activity is optimised. These mechanisms can require changes to be consulted on and 
plans to be published. More recently regulators have been required to carry out regulatory 
impact assessments of certain changes in their activities which are then reported to the 
BEIS-sponsored Regulatory Policy Committee and will be taken into account within their 
sponsor department’s budget for reducing regulatory impact on business.  
Response from regulators 
10.4. It was clear from the analysis of the initial data returns from regulators that in-scope 
regulators perceive burdens as a problem, albeit of varying size. There was a particular 
focus upon the requirements set down in the Enterprise Act for them to conduct 
Regulatory Impact Assessments which will then count towards their sponsor department’s 
regulation budget. With the exception of the Business Impact Target (BIT) (and some 
regulators recognised that this may be a product of the timing of the review), the view of 
regulators is that no single initiative is necessarily to blame across the board, but a ‘drip-
feed’ of burdens has built up over time which is presenting them with a number of 
resourcing challenges.  
10.5. A small number of regulators were able to provide a very detailed breakdown of the scale 
of these burdens whilst a larger number were even unwilling to provide a ball-park 
percentage estimate. Where provided, some of the smaller regulators estimated that 
burdens equated to somewhere between 1% and 5% of either full-time equivalent staff 
or their regulatory budget. With one or two notable exceptions this is not based on a 
particularly robust methodology and did not give consideration to all aspects of the 
burdens (e.g. full-costing across all activities). In general, larger regulators did not feel 
they added more than 1 to 2% to their costs. However, most of these estimates were 
impressionistic rather than based on detailed estimates. Overall these burdens are seen 
to affect regulators on a basis that is inversely proportional to their size 
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10.6. In all cases regulators were keen to emphasise that they had (despite struggles in some 
cases) incorporated burdens into their workload. In the case of some larger regulators, 
responsibility for the extra work has often been slotted into an existing function (for 
example evidence and analysis teams) or in some cases piggy-backed with other 
outsourced work to third parties.  
10.7. In some specific cases the burdens were highlighted as having some potential benefits 
to the regulator, although it is doubtful that these benefits outweigh the additional cost. 
On other occasions some of the burdens were downplayed as largely ‘business as usual’, 
for example through ongoing engagement with regulated organisations to understand the 
impact of regulatory interventions and an adherence to the Hampton principles.  
Case study: The Pensions Regulator 
The Pensions Regulator was able to provide a very detailed breakdown of burdens they face, although 
they did provide some positive messages that these were in effect ‘business as usual’. In line with 
Hampton principles and as part of ongoing dialogue with those they regulate, the Pensions Regulator 
indicated that many parts of the Accounting for Regulatory Impact (now superseded by the extension of 
the Business Impact Target) burdens they face were in fact actions they would have already been 
expected to undertake in any case. In this case some parts of the perceived burden were marginal, or 
merely focused around where and how that information is captured and presented. 
Types of burdens 
10.8. The surveys and interviews sought to find out the types of burdens faced and what 
changed as a result of them. As described above, most of the responses were qualitative 
in nature and have been grouped together into the table below. 
Resulted in additional effort / 
financial cost 
This was the most popular of the answers given, in terms of slotting 
into existing roles or regulators, reflecting that the burdens meant 
that it takes longer to get the same output achieved (e.g. waiting 
for RPC clearance). 
Resulted in changes in 
behaviour of regulated parties 
This was raised by one respondent, who pointed to the increased 
‘survey burden’ on those they regulate, although they did reflect 
this was a small price to pay for increased accountability.  
Resulted in additional cost to 
regulated parties 
This was only articulated by a very small number of respondents, 
for example the Gambling Commission identified that under a full-
cost recovery model consultation costs ultimately have to be 
collected through increases to operator fees. 
 
10.9. There was broad consensus that a solution was required to avoid government from 
utilising a ‘one-size fits all’ approach to interacting with regulators.  
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10.10. It was considered that the principle which government should abide by in its interactions 
with regulators is that of proportionality from the Better Regulation Task Force’s Principles 
of Good Regulation. The principle is explained as: “Regulators should only intervene 
when necessary. Remedies should be appropriate to the risk posed and costs identified 
and minimised.” There was broad agreement that the key area where there would be 
great benefit was that of introducing a de minimis threshold for impact assessments. 
10.11. The general view was that whilst some departments were proportionate in their 
requirements of regulators, government generally did not get the balance right and could 
adapt its approach in the same way that regulators have when considering policy 
interventions. 
10.12. Linked to this was recognition by regulators that there was value in performing reviews 
on a periodic basis but a preference that this was performed by those who are peers as 
this opened up opportunities to share best practice and learn from each other rather than 
the exercise being asymmetric in its benefits. 
10.13. Other areas where the regulators saw there being some value in helping to reduce burden 
was consistency and consolidation of reporting. Practical measures that were highlighted 
included maintenance of a catalogue at department level of information that had been 
provided by regulators to prevent duplication of effort and focused interactions. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
10.14. We recommend that government adopts the same principles expected of regulators 
when introducing new policy initiatives as stated in the Better Regulation Task Force’s 
Principles of Good Regulation.14 While these extend beyond proportionality, it is this very 
principle which if applied in dealings with regulators would result in fewer burdens. 
Government should also consider a de minimis threshold in relation to impact 
assessments. At a time where regulators’ resources are constrained, it seems 
appropriate to employ an approach to target the impact of initiatives. 
 
                                               
14  http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407162704/http:/archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ 
brc/upload/assets/www.brc.gov.uk/principlesleaflet.pdf 
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11. The potential benefits of our proposals 
Introduction 
11.1. Given the large number of regulators and the varied degree of involvement in the study 
the ability to provide robust estimates of the financial impact of our proposals is limited. 
In this section we provide estimates of orders of magnitude of the three proposals in the 
report with the greatest financial impact:  
 the presumption of full-cost charging for regulatory services; 
 the move towards greater regulated self-assurance and earned recognition; and  
 the move towards increased intelligence sharing. 
The impact of full-cost charging 
11.2. We were able to derive a split between charges and grant-in-aid for 45 of the 71 
regulators potentially in scope. This includes all the most significant regulators in terms 
of spend and so we consider it gives a broad indication of the size of the potential 
reduction in grant-in-aid if there were to be full cost recovery for regulatory activities. 
These figures were presented in Figure 5 and show that currently there is £1.37 billion 
per annum in grant in aid (which includes £329 million in grant to local authorities for 
regulatory activities which they carry out on behalf of national regulators). 
11.3. As discussed in the section on charging it may not be feasible or desirable to charge for 
some of the regulatory activities which currently receive grant in aid, for example much 
of the information, education and awareness-raising activities of the Health and Safety 
Executive, the Freedom of Information appeal activities of the Information 
Commissioner’s Office and where charging would simply be cross-charging other parts 
of the public sector.  
Figure 7: Potential benefits of moving to full-cost recovery 
Total Regulatory 
budget 
Total government 
grant funding 
Grant funding 
analysed 
Estimated value 
of cross 
charging 
Potential 
reduction 
(£m) (£m) (£m) (£m) (£m) 
£2,540m £1,370m £1,000m £360m £640m 
All figures rounded to nearest £10 million. 
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11.4. Some regulators are already consulting on or planning to move to full-cost charging over 
the next few years. The £1.37 billion per annum identified is therefore a gross potential 
saving rather than a net saving figure. Our analysis looked at the largest regulators where 
regulated self-assurance and earned recognition is feasible and/or those where cross-
charging of the public sector could be material; this included regulators such as Care 
Quality Commission, Environment Agency, Food Standards Agency, Health and Safety 
Executive, NHS Improvement and Ofsted as well as some Local Authority spend on 
regulation, and amounted to £1 billion. While not prejudging any decisions on how a 
default presumption of full-cost recovery to underpin a move to greater regulated self-
assurance might be implemented, we identify in Figure 7 the total of the £1 billion per 
annum which is cross-charging within the public sector, and make a judgement as to what 
proportion of the remainder might be judged inappropriate to be charged for. 
Nevertheless, after these adjustments there is still a potential saving of at least £500 
million (note that these figures do not include some regulators. If the default presumption 
of full cost-charging were to be applied across all regulators, then the benefit would 
therefore be greater than this estimate). 
11.5. We assume that the impact of any changes to the structure of charges will have a zero 
net impact as there will be reductions in charges for those who impose less cost on 
regulators to counterbalance any increase in charges for those who impose a significant 
costs on regulators. 
The benefits of a move to greater regulated self-assurance and 
earned recognition 
11.6. Estimating the potential benefits of a move to greater regulated self-assurance and 
earned recognition is inevitably more difficult than estimating the benefits from a move to 
full-cost recovery for regulatory activities for a number of reasons: 
 the proposals are for a direction of travel where the pace of movement will differ and 
the end point will vary depending on the nature and structure of the sector concerned 
and the judgement of ministers and regulators concerning the degree of risk that they 
may be prepared to bear as well as the accountability which is required;  
 there may be greater caution exercised in industries where there is a higher degree 
of historical criminality involved; 
 company self-assessment and reporting may be more feasible in sectors which are 
very concentrated (e.g. regulation of drinking water), than in sectors which are more 
diverse (e.g. catering or childminding); and 
 different sectors are at different stages of development of such an approach and 
hence the scope for savings may differ. For example, the Civil Aviation Authority 
where such an approach is used compared to the DVSA or the Food Standards 
Agency where they are relatively less developed in parts of their activities. 
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11.7. Our analysis looked at those larger regulators where a move to greater regulated self-
assurance and earned recognition could be considered to be material. This included 
regulators such as the CQC, the DVSA, Food Standards Agency, Health and Safety 
Executive and Ofsted. In the case of the Environment Agency, we consider there is some 
potential for savings through further self-assurance. However, it is unlikely to be a priority 
in the short to medium term as the organisation is focused on supporting government in 
the withdrawal from the European Union and working with Defra on transformational 
change. 
11.8. Discussion with the regulators suggested that the benefits may be variable. Firm 
estimates can only be derived once detailed feasibility work has been carried out on 
mechanisms for self-reporting by regulated entities, the extent of sampling to be carried 
out by the regulator as well as the ‘length of the tail’ of establishments where there is 
likely to be a continued need for the statutory regulator still to be involved.  
11.9. In a few cases, detailed costing work has already been carried out by the regulator in 
relation to some of these proposals. In other cases there are regulatory impact 
assessments which have been carried out of past moves in this direction which can give 
an indication of the potential benefits from such approaches being applied in other cases. 
We set out a few of these examples, before providing a judgement of the potential 
benefits overall. 
Dairy hygiene inspections 
In 2011 the Food Standards Agency consulted on a new approach to inspection of dairy hygiene. It was 
proposed that if a farm was a member of the “Assured Dairy Farm” (ADF) scheme (95% of cows’ milk 
purchased in England and Wales is from ADF- approved farms) they would be inspected by the Food 
Standards Agency on average once every 10 years compared to once every 2 years for non-ADF approved 
farms. The impact assessment showed that this would reduce inspection costs by 75%. 
 
Feed law interventions 
In 2014 the Food Standards Agency proposed to use an earned recognition scheme for feed law 
inspections. The EU had found that the frequency of inspection by local authorities was not sufficient to 
ensure that the Feed Law Code of Practice was being adhered to. The FSA therefore introduced an 
earned recognition scheme whereby inspections were less frequent for farms which used an FSA 
recognised feed assurance scheme. This enabled the FSA to ensure that there was an appropriate level 
of monitoring to meet the statutory requirements at no increased cost. The impact assessment estimated 
that if an appropriate number of inspections were carried out to meet the statutory requirements using a 
non-earned recognition approach, 2.4 times more inspections would be required. Hence the earned 
recognition approach led to a cost reduction of approximately 60%. 
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DVSA feasibility study of earned recognition approach to heavy goods vehicle 
and public service vehicle operator roadside checks 
DVSA carried out a feasibility study of the benefits of using an earned recognition approach for roadside 
checks for operators with the lowest risk scores who wished to be part of such a scheme. The resultant 
savings when extrapolated indicated that savings in inspection costs overall could be of the order of 10%, 
and could be greater if commercial pressures encouraged more firms to opt to be part of the scheme. 
There may also be a benefit to operators if their vehicles were not stopped as frequently, raising the 
potential for improved commercial performance. 
 
Ofsted estimates of savings from changes to inspection approach 
Ofsted’s core funding is due to drop from £155 million in 2016/17 to £123.5 million in 2019/20. They plan 
to meet this gap by a combination of fee increases, efficiencies and greater use of earned recognition in 
their approach to inspections. The greater use of earned recognition is estimated to result in a total costs 
saving (i.e. not just inspection) of around 8% by 2020. These estimates do not include the benefit of any 
move to a greater use of inspection at a multi-academy trust level or greater use of current practitioners 
in inspection which could lead to further savings. 
 
11.10. A few points should be emphasised concerning these estimates. They are not necessarily 
(and in most cases will not be) net additional savings to what is already planned in terms 
of expenditure reductions for the regulators. Rather they illustrate the mechanisms which 
might be used to attain those budget reductions. Secondly, they cannot be added to the 
income from charges to attain a total reduction in Exchequer costs. If there were to be 
total cost recovery through charging for regulated activities the benefit of any reduction 
in costs of regulation would be passed through to the regulated in line with the principles 
of ‘Managing Public Money’. 
11.11. In estimating the potential benefits from greater use of regulated self-assurance and 
earned recognition it is important to recognise that the degree of proactive inspection 
activity varies considerably between regulators. In most of the ‘inspection heavy’ 
regulators (e.g. FSA, Ofsted, CQC) which tend to be the largest of the regulators, 
inspection and directly related costs can be 50% or more of total costs. In others which 
are more reactive it will be much less (e.g. Charity Commission and Legal Services 
Board), typically well below 10% of costs. 
11.12. In our judgement, based on the available evidence and the nature of the activities of the 
larger regulators (CQC, HSE, Ofsted, DVSA and FSA), the potential benefits are likely to 
be an average of around 10% of their total costs, and hence of the order of £120 million. 
It should be noted that in the case of individual regulators the scope for savings may be 
significantly more or less than this average estimate of 10%. 
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Figure 8: Potential benefits of moving to greater regulated self-assurance and 
earned recognition  
Total Regulatory 
budget 
Regulatory budget 
analysed 
Potential benefits Potential benefits 
(£m) (£m) (£m) (%) 
£2,540m £1,080m £120m 11% 
Note: all figures rounded to nearest £10 million or percentage point 
The benefits of a move to increased intelligence sharing 
11.13. Our work identified the requirement from regulators for a co-ordinated approach to 
intelligence sharing across different regulatory areas. This led to the formation of the 
concept of a Regulatory Intelligence Hub which could address a number of intelligence 
sharing related matters.  
11.14. The benefits of such an approach could also extend to cost savings. Outline estimates 
suggest that savings in the order of £7.5 million per annum are achievable from such a 
concept, assuming that a group of 30 regulators spending on average £1 million on 
intelligence can make savings of 25% in line with previous pilots.  
11.15. These savings are approximations and a full business case exploring the funding, 
resourcing and potential savings would need to be undertaken, however this illustrates 
the scale of the potential savings from a centralised investment in a Regulatory 
Intelligence Hub. 
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12. Conclusions and recommendations  
12.1. Our examination of effective regulatory delivery models has identified that important 
attributes of good regulation are that they focus, as far as feasible, on outcomes and 
make use of a wide range of levers to reduce harm and improve quality. These levers 
can include using the influence of purchasers/commissioners, professionals involved in 
the sector and user/consumer pressure. Using such levers, as well as the quality-
management systems of regulated entities themselves, ensures that assurance 
processes, from wherever they come, can be minimised whilst still meeting desired 
regulatory outcomes. 
12.2. We believe that there is considerable scope to extend this approach, which we have 
termed ‘regulated self-assurance’, among regulators and ‘earned recognition’ for publicly 
funded entities and that among those regulators who currently rely heavily on inspection 
this can enable greater efficiency in meeting regulatory outcomes and reducing the 
burden of duplicate assurance processes on businesses. The scale of the potential cost 
savings which might be attained among inspection-heavy regulators we judge could be 
of the order of 10% of total costs. More detailed feasibility work by the regulators in 
assessing how this concept would apply to them would be needed to verify this estimate. 
There would also be further savings among the regulated through avoiding the direct 
costs for them of duplicate assurance processes which we have not included in estimates 
of the benefits. 
12.3. It should be stressed that regulated self-assurance and earned recognition is different 
from self-regulation. Many of the sectors which are highly regulated, for example water 
companies in respect of drinking water quality, make very substantial use of the internal 
quality assurance processes of the regulated within a regulatory framework set by, in that 
case, the Drinking Water Inspectorate. 
12.4. The current system of charging for regulation varies considerably between sectors and is 
often more a function of history and circumstance rather than logic. However the fact that 
the regulated may not be charged the full economic cost of regulation means that there 
can be a disincentive for adoption of regulated self-assurance. We therefore propose that 
there should be a default presumption of full cost recovery for regulatory activities where 
regulated self-assurance is feasible, and that further attention should be given to ensuring 
that the structure of charges results in the greatest cost burden falling on those who cause 
the greatest cost to the regulator - cost-reflective charging. 
12.5. We appreciate that this may not be appropriate in all cases (for example, where the 
regulated entity is publicly funded or where a significant part of the regulator’s activity is 
provision of information and education). Currently, for those regulators for which we had 
the required data, around half (£1.37 billion per annum) of the cost of regulation came 
from government grant. We estimate that introducing a default presumption of full-cost 
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recovery where regulatory self-assurance is feasible, could yield net Exchequer savings 
of at least £500 million per annum. 
12.6. Introducing greater regulated self-assurance for businesses would also introduce a 
degree of contestability into assurance processes which would provide a pressure for 
efficiency on the regulator which, along with a requirement to consult on fees and 
charges, should allay any concerns that a greater reliance on full-cost recovery, rather 
than government grant, might lead to greater inefficiency.  
12.7. In addition to greater use of regulated self-assurance to drive efficiency improvements, 
we found that there remains untapped scope to improve intelligence and information 
sharing between regulators. The benefits of information sharing between regulators 
primarily accrue directly to the regulated through only having to ‘tell us once’. Our work 
here has identified what information is being collected by regulators. As there are a 
number of initiatives underway on this led by the Government Digital Service and others, 
we have focused more on the potential of intelligence sharing which can then enable 
more targeted and efficient inspection activities. Pathfinder projects have been identified 
in the areas of farm inspection and labour market enforcement and Health and Safety 
Executive will pursue these projects in the short term with the regulators concerned to 
test the potential benefits (and costs) of further work in this area. Other longer-term 
projects have also been identified. 
12.8. Regulators also feel that there is considerable potential for a more co-ordinated approach 
through the establishment of a Regulatory Intelligence Hub. While the pathfinders can 
help to illustrate the benefits of establishing a hub, developing a standard approach to 
intelligence sharing can help to avoid the creation of multiple dissimilar bilateral 
arrangements.  
12.9. The Regulatory Futures Review has highlighted the potential benefits of increased 
sharing of best practice between regulators. Some of these examples are highlighted 
formally in this report, others have arisen on a more bilateral and informal basis through 
contacts made during review workshops. We believe that there is value in building on 
these contacts through a rather more formalised network of regulators, including some 
common training, events around common issues and problems as well as a repository of 
best regulatory practice. Whilst this could build on one of the existing more specific 
networks of regulators, for example. economic or safety regulators, we consider that there 
would be value in a broader network. This would require a small central team (two to 
three fixed-term equivalent) funded by the regulators.  
12.10. We also considered the extent to which burdens placed by government on regulators are 
imposing an undue cost. The impact of these burdens are felt most strongly by small 
regulators and so we consider that a more proportionate approach from government 
would be merited. 
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Summary of recommendations 
12.11. We recommend that regulators and their sponsor departments should respond on 
how far and how fast they can move on the two changes envisaged here: a presumption 
of a move to greater regulated self-assurance and earned recognition underpinned by full 
cost recovery for regulatory activities. 
12.12. As some of the above would require legislative change we recommend that government 
should reflect on the impact on policy and set out a definite way forward for 
implementation. Government should also consider further ideas such as companies or 
sectors having a ‘right to challenge’ regulators by setting out how they propose they might 
provide their own assurance model within the broad framework of regulated 
self-assurance. 
12.13. We recommend that regulators as a group should take forward the pathfinder projects 
for intelligence sharing in relation to farm inspections and labour market and establish a 
working group to report back in six months on the feasibility, scope and funding 
mechanism of a Regulatory Intelligence Hub. Alongside this a working group of regulators 
should take forward the idea of establishing a small central hub to encourage 
development and sharing of regulatory models and good practice. 
12.14. We recommend that the Better Regulation Executive together with regulators should 
consider and report back within 6 months as to how burdens placed on smaller regulators 
might be made more proportionate. 
12.15. We recommend that regulators should move as far as practicable towards an outcome-
based approach to regulation. Regulators should also consider how such a change 
should affect the level and nature of their engagement with regulated companies. We 
further recommend that regulators should periodically (around every five years) review 
their regulatory approach, with a view to stripping back accumulations of excessive 
standards and process controls. We also recommend that all regulators should consider 
how far they can make use of other agents who can bring influence to bear on minimising 
harm and improving the quality of services as part of their regulatory strategy. 
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Glossary 
Abbreviation Definition 
ADF Assured Dairy Farm 
AIC Agricultural Industries Confederation 
ARI Accounting for Regulatory Impact 
APHA Animal and Plant Health Agency 
API Application Programming Interface 
BEIS Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy  
BIS Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
BIT Business Impact Target 
BRC British Retail Consortium 
BRDO Better Regulation Delivery Office 
CQC Care Quality Commission 
CB Certification Body 
CC Charity Commission for England and Wales 
CAA Civil Aviation Authority 
CCG Clinical Commissioning Group 
DCLG Department for Communities and Local Government 
DCMS Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
Defra Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
DfE Department for Education 
DfT Department for Transport 
DH Department of Health 
DPA Data Protection Act 
DWP Department for Work and Pensions 
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Abbreviation Definition 
DVSA Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency 
EFA Education Funding Agency 
EAS Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate 
EA Environment Agency 
FCA Financial Conduct Authority 
FRC Financial Reporting Council 
FSA Food Standards Agency 
GC Gambling Commission 
GP General Practitioner 
HEFCE Higher Education Funding Council for England 
HGV Heavy Goods Vehicle 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
HMI Her Majesty’s Inspector 
HMIP HM Inspectorate of Prisons 
HMRC-NMW Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs – National Minimum Wage 
HR Human Resources 
HCA Homes and Communities Agency 
ICO Information Commissioner’s Office 
IRIS Intelligent Regulatory Information System 
IS Insolvency Service 
LA Local Authority 
LSB Legal Services Board 
LSE London School of Economics 
MHI Meat Hygiene Inspector 
MHRA Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
MoJ Ministry of Justice 
74 | Regulatory Futures Review: Glossary 
 
 
Abbreviation Definition 
MPM Managing Public Money 
NHS National Health Service 
NMRO National Measurement and Regulation Office. NMRO was abolished on 
1 April 2016 and brought back into the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (now BEIS). The Regulatory Delivery Office is the directorate in 
BEIS that now carries out the regulatory functions of ex-NMRO and 
ex-BRDO. 
NHSI NHS Improvement 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ONR Office of Nuclear Regulation 
ONS Office for National Statistics 
ORR Office of Rail and Road 
Ofqual Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation 
Ofsted Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills 
PPF Pension Protection Fund 
PSA Professional Standards Agency for Health & Social Care 
RPA Rural Payments Agency 
TPR The Pensions Regulator 
VMD Veterinary Medicines Directorate 
 
 
